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INTRODUCTION 
 In Geduldig v. Aiello, the Supreme Court of the United States held that 
pregnancy discrimination is not discrimination against women.3 Differential 
treatment based on pregnancy, the Court said, merely distinguishes between a 
group consisting of pregnant women and a group consisting of “nonpregnant 
persons.”4 The Court noted a “lack of identity between the excluded disability 
and gender as such.”5 Thus was discrimination based on pregnancy—one of the 
quintessential differences in the capacities of female and male bodies—
rendered something other than sex discrimination.  
 Such precedent is dangerous. Without gendered language, it is impossible 
to articulate that the group of “nonpregnant persons” consists itself of two dis-
tinct groups: men, who cannot become pregnant, and women, who can. As a 
result of the Court’s opinion, and that in similar cases such as General Electric 
Co. v. Gilbert,6 only the latter group faced the danger of being linguistically 
erased as a distinct class and, in this erasure, stood at risk of pregnancy discrim-
ination without recourse to constitutional protections.7 Fortunately, the error 
                                                
3  Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974), superseded by statute, Pregnancy Discrimination 
Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-555, 92 Stat. 2076 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (2012)). 
4  Id. at 496 n.20. 
5  Id. 
6  Gen. Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976). 
7  For these concerns and others shared by Congress, see S. COMM. ON LABOR AND HUMAN 
RES., LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE PREGNANCY DISCRIMINATION ACT OF 1978 (1980), 
https://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=pur1.32754076789159 [https://perma.cc/3SX9-58VR]. 
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was swiftly reversed.8 Congress itself overturned the Geduldig decision via the 
Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978.9 
 Linguistic erasure cannot diminish, let alone extinguish, the real, physical 
consequences of being female-bodied in a system of legalized misogyny.10 
“Language, of course, did not create the patriarchy, but language is a powerful 
method of inscribing the possible, shaping how and what we think, and justify-
ing the status quo.”11 The Geduldig decision did just that, using linguistic eras-
ure to justify and legalize the sex-based misogyny of its age. 
 This erasure is ongoing. It is not a relic of some sexist linguistic past. The 
category “woman” has been ignored or subsumed into larger identity move-
ments and academic categories. For example, all over the United States, “wom-
en’s studies” programs have been renamed in favor of the more neutral catego-
ry of “gender studies.”12 Even Harvard’s Journal of Law and Gender was 
founded as the “Harvard Women’s Law Journal.”13 
This linguistic muddying is troubling. While it is true “that members of a 
particular race, class, gender, and sexual orientation have different experiences” 
                                                
8  42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (2012). 
9  Today, the Act reads in relevant part: “The terms ‘because of sex’ or ‘on the basis of sex’ 
include, but are not limited to, because of or on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth, or related 
medical conditions; and women affected by pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical condi-
tions shall be treated the same for all employment-related purposes . . . as other persons not 
so affected but similar in their ability or inability to work, and nothing in section 2000e-2(h) 
of this title shall be interpreted to permit otherwise.” Id. (emphasis added). 
10  When I refer to legal discrimination against women, I refer specifically to the long history 
of legalized misogyny: that is, the hatred (Greek root “miso”) of women/females (Greek root 
“gyne,” coming from the ancient meaning of “begetter,” or one who gives birth). Misogyny, 
ONLINE ETYMOLOGY DICTIONARY, http://www.etymonline.com/index.php?term=misogyny& 
allowed_in_frame=0 [https://perma.cc/R4LU-29RK] (last visited Mar. 20, 2017); see also 
Thelma Charen, Gynecology: An Etymological Note, 59 BULL. MED. LIBR. ASS’N. 585, 585 
(1971), http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC197651/?page=1 [https://perma.cc/5 
ZA5-REPS]. 
11  John A. McCarroll, Male Privilege Redefined, Not Negated, VOICE MALE MAG., 
http://voicemalemagazine.org/summer-2014/male-privilege-redefined-not-negated [https://pe 
rma.cc/53DQ-5M8B] (last visited Mar. 22, 2017). 
12  See, e.g., DOING GENDER IN MEDIA, ART AND CULTURE 1 (Rosemarie Buikema & Iris van 
der Tuin eds., 2007); Annette Schad-Seifert, Samurai and Sarariiman: The Discourse on 
Masculinity in Modern Japan, in CAN JAPAN GLOBALIZE? 200 (Arne Holzhausen ed., 2001); 
Women’s Studies, UNIV. OF AUCKLAND, http://www.arts.auckland.ac.nz/en/about/subjects-
and-courses/womens-studies.html? [https://perma.cc/GQG4-PS3S] (last visited Mar. 22, 
2017). 
13  About JLG, HARV. J. L. & GENDER, http://harvardjlg.com [https://perma.cc/8JHA-32KR] 
(last visited Mar. 22, 2017). But this is not an all-encompassing trend—fortunately. For ex-
ample, UCLA retains both a women’s journal and a journal on gender identity. Law Reviews 
& Journals, UCLA LAW, https://law.ucla.edu/student-life/law-reviews-and-journals 
[https://perma.cc/A9XH-PGH7] (last visited Mar. 22, 2017). 
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that intersect with the reality of being female,14 third wave feminism is mis-
guided in its attempts to divorce feminist concerns and the language of woman-
hood from the reality of femaleness. Woman-specific language allows the law 
to describe sex-based protections—and without it, the law risks a lack of clarity 
that could result in the same kind of legalized misogyny that the Supreme Court 
promulgated just forty years ago.15 Thus, this Note will discuss why the broad 
category of “gender” does not adequately cover what are still very much wom-
en’s issues—and why the term “woman” is still a legal necessity. 
Legal feminists16 argue for a legal system that will “avoid [the] use of gen-
der-biased language, and retain gendered language when appropriate.”17 There 
are undeniable legal consequences of living in a female body, and these are as 
real now as they were in Geduldig’s decade. Thus, women-specific language 
must be used in legal discussions of sex-based discrimination, including when 
remedying historical discrimination (such as creating equal pay legislation and 
ensuring women’s access to healthcare).18 Such class-based language is neces-
sity in feminist struggle. All persons born female, regardless of what other de-
mographic categories to which we may belong, endure the material reality of 
being born female—with the biological, legal, and historical legacy attached to 
it. The concepts of “ ‘women as sex class’, and ‘women-centred analysis and 
political concerns’ . . . arose out of consciousness-raising in the 1960s and 
1970s.”19 Not only legal feminists, but all of us who advocate for the protection 
of women’s bodily autonomy must have the language to name the problem—a 
problem that is all too often, in the words of the popular Internet adage, “a gov-
ernment so small it fits inside [a woman’s] uterus.”20 
                                                
14  Kathleen Kelly Janus, Finding Common Feminist Ground: The Role of the Next Genera-
tion in Shaping Feminist Legal Theory, 20 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 255, 268 (2013). 
15  See Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974), superseded by statute, Pregnancy Discrimi-
nation Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-555, 92 Stat. 2076 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) 
(2012)). 
16  For a brief overview of legal feminism, see Joanne Conaghan, Reassessing the Feminist 
Theoretical Project in Law, 27 J. L. & SOC’Y 351 (2000). 
17  Karen J. Sneddon, Not Your Mother’s Will: Gender, Language, and Wills, 98 MARQ. L. 
REV. 1535, 1539 (2015). 
18  I was tempted to adopt the phrase “sex-based oppression,” which is customary radical 
feminist usage, in this Note. However, misogyny is a matter of degree. We should distin-
guish between the misogyny experienced by women in the West, and that experienced by 
girls in countries where, for example, forced marriage and female genital mutilation are the 
norm. So, I have elected to use the less charged term “discrimination” where I am referring 
to the everyday legal and cultural sexism encountered in the developed world, while retain-
ing the term “oppression” where it should be emphasized. 
19  See, e.g., Jeannie Wright et al., The “F” Word: The Challenge of Feminism and the Prac-
tice of Counselling Twenty Years On, 28 N.Z. J. OF COUNSELLING 87, 93 (2008). 
20  A Government So Small It Fits Inside My Uterus, WOMEN’S RTS. NEWS (Jan. 20, 2015) 
www.viralwomen.com/post/womens_march_on_nashville_a_government_so_small_it_fits_i
nside_my_uterus [https://perma.cc/SU4B-VJNL]. 
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However, legal language must not speak of sex or gender in a way that re-
lies on stereotypical notions of masculinity and femininity, including alleged 
“inherent” differences in women’s and men’s brains. Cautioning against this 
kind of language use, early feminists like Charlotte Perkins Gilman articulated 
that “[t]here is no female mind. The brain is not an organ of sex. As well speak 
of a female liver.”21 This language was useful in the late nineteenth century be-
cause it was this so-called “female mind” that held women back in the legal—
and almost every other—sphere.22 Gilman’s analogy is useful today because 
while differences in personality, expression, ability, and taste can certainly im-
pact the ways in which women are disadvantaged,23 the origins of sex discrimi-
nation are just that: biological sex. This Note explores how and why sex-based 
discrimination is still a rampant force—and how and why, in the fight against 
it, those advocating for the equal rights and treatment of all populations must 
have access to precise language. 
Essentially, the law—and the reader—must distinguish between real versus 
specious sex differences. This is a fine line. Aware that a “true” distillation of 
the two concepts calls for a scientific, cultural, and philosophic conversation 
well beyond its scope, this Note focuses on the verifiable sex differences that 
legally disadvantage women: those based in biology, as exemplified in the 
Geduldig decision. In other words, the language of the law should acknowledge 
and constitutionally protect real, biological sex differences precisely because 
they are real: because they are based in the body—the only plane of reality that 
the law can effectively govern—and because they have historically imposed, 
and continue today to impose, material consequences on women. At the same 
time, the law should refuse to participate in the ages-old practice of stereotyp-
ing and disenfranchising the female sex based on assumed mental capacities. 
As this Note will examine, such stereotyping has long been based on the unsci-
entific, unverifiable concept of “brain sex,” and has been used almost exclu-
sively to exclude women from full participation in social and political life.24 
                                                
21  CHARLOTTE PERKINS GILMAN, WOMEN AND ECONOMICS 149 (U.C. Press 1998) (1898). 
22  See, e.g., infra Parts I, II. 
23  See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 235 (1989), for ways in which women 
have been legally discriminated against for not performing stereotypical femininity, and 
Weinstock v. Columbia Univ., 224 F.3d 33, 39 (2d Cir. 2000), for ways in which they can be 
discriminated against for performing it. 
24  Such a distinction might be analogized to racial differences and the necessity of constitu-
tional protection based on race. That is, there are real racial differences based in material re-
ality—ancestry, skin color, etc.—that cannot be changed within one individual, differences 
that disadvantage people of color in the Anglo-American legal system. There are also spe-
cious racial differences based in the world of stereotype and pseudo-science, for example 
supposed differences in brain structure that white supremacists once did and might continue 
to use to claim that people of color have or lack certain inherent abilities. See, e.g., Audrey 
Smedley & Brian D. Smedley, Race as Biology Is Fiction, Racism as a Social Problem Is 
Real, 60 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 16 (2005). The law should absolutely acknowledge the real dif-
ferences, both to prevent further discrimination and to compensate for past discrimination. 
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In addition to returning to some of the root language of feminism, this 
Note’s proposed legal framework is not dissimilar from that articulated by Jus-
tice Ruth Bader Ginsburg: 
Sex classifications may be used to compensate women “for particular economic 
disabilities [they have] suffered,” to “promot[e] equal employment opportunity,” 
to advance full development of the talent and capacities of our Nation's people. 
But such classifications may not be used, as they once were, to create or perpet-
uate the legal, social, and economic inferiority of women.25 
The law must afford dignity to marginalized people. To that end, all histor-
ically disadvantaged groups—women, people of color, lesbians, gay men, bi-
sexual people, transgender individuals, the disabled, the poor—must be able 
not only to speak in solidarity with one another, but also to speak about their 
issues with linguistic specificity. To do otherwise gives lawmakers the chance 
to bury issues in a tangle of unspecific, convoluted language—as in the blatant-
ly sexist Geduldig decision.26 
Part I of this Note discusses the historical use of the word “woman” in An-
glo-American law, and why at times its absence and its distracting euphemisms 
have created problems for women’s legal status. Part II offers a short survey of 
how legalized discrimination against women has been based on female biology. 
Historically, this biology included not only an “inferior” body but a conse-
quently inferior “female brain.” This Part also details the postmodern return of 
“brain-sex” language and the legal danger this concept has always imposed. 
Part III relies on this history to describe the legal consequences of living in a 
female body—with its assumed “female brain”—in the political climate of the 
early 21st century. This reality deserves specific language to acknowledge it—
language feminists can use in the fight against the negative effects of that reali-
ty. The harassment suffered by modern feminists who attempt to name the 
problem of sex-based discrimination also lends support to the argument that  
censoring the word “woman” is inappropriate in feminist discourse, particularly 
in the context of legal feminism, which must acknowledge the history of sex-
based discrimination in order to be effective. Part IV offers an international 
perspective of when it is appropriate, and even necessary, to use woman-
specific language. The term “woman” is important for accurate discourse 
across diverse cultures and language. For example, the key international treaty 
on women’s position in society can only operate effectively if woman-specific 
                                                                                                             
But it would be a grave injustice to even consider the specious. Because this is such an im-
perfect analogy, I mention it here for a contextual comparison, only. 
25  United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533–34 (1996) (citations omitted). 
26  Justice Anthony Kennedy noted the problem of linguistic non-specificity in his concurring 
opinion in a recent affirmative action case, highlighting how—given history and a racist sta-
tus quo—Justice John Roberts’ assertion that “[t]he way to stop discrimination on the basis 
of race is to stop discriminating on the basis of race” is “not sufficient.” Parents Involved in 
Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 788 (2007). 
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language is used, and is uniformly understood by all. Finally, Part V offers 
suggestions for continuing legal feminist discourse in the climate of postmod-
ern identity. 
I.   THE HISTORY OF THE WORD “WOMAN” IN THE LAW: CONSTITUTION TO 
COVERTURE TO CREDIT 
A.    The Founding’s Missing Women 
 Male-centric language dominates Anglo-American law; together with legal 
history, this reveals “widely held views about women’s proper place.”27 That 
place has only recently included higher education and legal participation. Given 
the cyclical nature of women’s rights,28 it is foolish to think that sexist thinking 
could not reassert itself into modern law—especially when, through “scientifi-
cally” validated neurosexism, the process has already begun.29 
 The Declaration of Independence purports equality for “all men.”30 And the 
Founders undoubtedly meant men, not women—despite Abigail Adams’s re-
monstrations to her husband to “remember the Ladies.”31 In fact, just as this 
Note argues, Adams cautioned over two centuries ago that “[i]f perticuliar [sic] 
care and attention is not paid to the Laidies [sic],” the law will not acknowledge 
them, except to subject them to differential treatment and to make women’s 
husbands “head and master.”32 In his response, John Adams wrote that any 
acknowledgement of women in the law would surely “subject [men] to the 
Despotism of the Peticoat [sic]”—a response not dissimilar from that of many 
of today’s anti-feminists.33 
                                                
27  Virginia, 518 U.S. at 537. 
28  See generally JANE F. GARDNER, WOMEN IN ROMAN LAW AND SOCIETY (1986). For discus-
sions of societies in which women once held prominent legal and social roles, see generally 
Caitlin Christine Maya Larson, Viking Social Structure and Gender Roles in Scandinavia 
Based on Burials and Grave Goods (2012) (unpublished B.S. thesis, University of Wiscon-
sin-La Crosse), https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/10597635.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q663-8U4 
F]. 
29  See infra Part II. 
30  Black men and other men of color, of course, were also excluded by the Founders, and by 
many other officials and ordinary citizens since. 
31  Letter from Abigail Adams to John Adams (Mar. 31, 1776), http://history.hanover.edu/ 
courses/excerpts/165adams-rtl.html [https://perma.cc/LV7R-R46R] (last visited Mar. 22, 
2017). Given her position, it is not unthinkable that Adams objected to the Declaration’s 
specifying that Americans had “oppos[ed] with manly firmness” the English king’s tyran-
nies. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 7 (U.S. 1776) (emphasis added). 
32  Letter from Abigail Adams, supra note 31; Kirchberg v. Feenstra, 450 U.S. 455, 456 
(1981). 
33  Letter from John Adams to Abigail Adams (Apr. 14, 1776), http://history.hanover.edu/cou 
rses/excerpts/165adams-rtl.html [https://perma.cc/LV7R-R46R] (last visited Mar. 22, 2017). 
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As legal feminist Catherine MacKinnon explains, “constitutions have been 
almost exclusively man-made, and it shows.”34 The original text of the U.S. 
Constitution uses the allegedly neutral term “person,” but it makes liberal use 
of male pronouns.35 Even the Nineteenth Amendment, which enshrined into 
law the result of women’s decades-long fight to gain the right to vote, does not 
include the term “woman.”36 And indeed, although the phrase “the right of citi-
zens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged . . . on account 
of sex” led to the vote for women, it did not lead to the expansion of any other 
rights for early twentieth century American women. The Nineteenth Amend-
ment has been suggested and rejected as a source for the advancement of wom-
an’s rights—a fact that speaks to the limited use of language that does not spe-
cifically address women in the context of women’s liberation.37 
The refusal to address women’s legal status at the founding permitted 
many legal abuses against women. For example, coverture defined married 
women first as entities entirely joined with their husbands—and thus unable to 
exercise their own legal or economic rights—and then, in a “corrupt[ion]” of 
the doctrine, as entities explicitly owned by their husbands.38 The last vestige of 
this English common law doctrine, the so-called “marital rape exemption,” was 
only overturned in the United States in the 1970s.39 
B.   Sexist Legal Language 
 Ironically, in historical instances where legal language did not leave wom-
en out, it specifically disadvantaged them. Many stereotypical, sexist expecta-
tions of women have been given legal precedence over the course of American 
legal history.40 For example, Myra Colby Bradwell, and all of her sex, were 
                                                
34 Catharine A MacKinnon, Gender in Constitutions, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF 
COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 397 (Michel Rosenfeld & András Sajó eds., 2012). 
35  See generally U.S. CONST. 
36  U.S. CONST. amend. XIX. 
37  Sarah B. Lawsky, Note, A Nineteenth Amendment Defense of the Violence Against Wom-
en Act, 109 Yale L.J. 783, 790 n.40 (describing that the Supreme Court's “broad vision of the 
Nineteenth Amendment” has not been put “to further use”); Adkins v. Children’s Hosp., 261 
U.S. 525, 553 (1923) (noting “the great—not to say revolutionary—changes which have tak-
en place since that utterance, in the contractual, political and civil status of women, culmi-
nating in the Nineteenth Amendment, it is not unreasonable to say that these differences 
[“the ancient inequality of the sexes”] have now come almost, if not quite, to the vanishing 
point”). 
38  Suzanne McGee & Heidi Moore, Women’s Rights and Their Money: A Timeline from 
Cleopatra to Lilly Ledbetter, THE GUARDIAN (Aug. 11, 2014), http://www.theguardian.com/ 
money/us-money-blog/2014/aug/11/women-rights-money-timeline-history [https://perma.cc/ 
9KGD-LKPX]. 
39  See Claudia Zaher, When a Woman’s Marital Status Determined Her Legal Status: A Re-
search Guide on the Common Law Doctrine of Coverture, 94 LAW LIBR. J. 459, 474 (2002). 
40  See, e.g., Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 365 (1879) (Field, J., dissenting) (comparing 
women to children in saying that Virginia’s exclusion of them as jurors does not “impair[] 
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deemed by nature unfit for the legal profession by Illinois in 1872.41 The Su-
preme Court would not address this sexist precedent, nor any other discrimina-
tory sex-based distinction, until Reed v. Reed in 1971—a full century after the 
Bradwell decision.42 
Women’s “natural” meekness placed other legal burdens on them; for ex-
ample, in negligence actions, they were held to a higher legal standard on that 
basis.43 Judge Cooley stated in 1880: “a woman's natural timidity and inexperi-
ence with dangers inclines her to be more cautious; and if we naturally and rea-
sonably look for greater caution in the woman than in the man, any rule of law 
that demands less must be unphilosophical and unreasonable.”44 This meant 
that “when the actor is a woman, an instruction that she is bound to observe the 
conduct of a woman of common and ordinary prudence, cannot be held legally 
erroneous because of being thus special.”45 This legal precedent is based on sex 
stereotypes. Women, viewed as “naturally” timid, are disadvantaged legally by 
being held to a higher standard than her male counterparts. Not insignificantly, 
this Michigan precedent has never been overruled. Even today, women and 
men are held to different negligence standards based on stereotypes about the 
sexes’ inborn personalities.46 Frustratingly, many jurors likely evaluate “rea-
sonableness” based upon stereotypes of women and men; that is, they may ig-
nore real versus specious sex differences. Thus, even today’s legal frameworks 
offer significant opportunity for over-use of stereotype. 
C.   Legal Euphemisms for “Woman” 
 Frustratingly, where the word “women” should be used in the law, euphe-
mistic language often substitutes. This may be the case because, as some lin-
guists posit, the very word “woman” has developed a negative connotation.47 
                                                                                                             
their rights as citizens”); Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. 162, 178 (1874) (holding without 
even a brief equal protection analysis “that the constitutions and laws of the several States 
which commit [the right of suffrage] to men alone are not necessarily void”); Bradwell v. 
State, 83 U.S. 130, 133 (1872) (holding that women may be prohibited from practicing law); 
Jackson v. Phillips, 96 Mass. 539, 571 (1867) (allowing a decedent’s charitable gift to the 
abolitionist cause but refusing to allow the gift for the cause of advocating for women’s 
rights, under the guise that the latter has “no precedent”); Mich. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Has-
seneyer, 12 N.W. 155, 157 (Mich. 1882) (holding that women may be held to a higher stand-
ard of caution due to “natural timidity”); Dyett v. N. Am. Coal Co., 20 Wend. 570, 573 
(N.Y. 1838) (using the term “feme sole”—“single woman”—in relation to the legal doctrine 
by which married and single women were treated differently under the law). 
41  See generally Bradwell, 83 U.S. 130. 
42  See generally Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971). 
43  Hasseneyer, 12 N.W. at 157. 
44  Id. 
45  Id. 
46  Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 878 (9th Cir. 1991). 
47  Omi Morgenstern Leissner, The Problem That Has No Name, 4 CARDOZO WOMEN’S L.J. 
321, 373 (1998). 
17 NEV. L.J. 667 ORWOLL -FINAL.DOCX 5/10/17  1:12 PM 
676 NEVADA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 17:667  
There is a certain “avoidance of the use of the word ‘woman’ ” that may be 
caused by the “sexual” or “embarrassing” connotations of the word.48 There is 
no denying that the word has both. After all, there is no more potent symbol of 
sex on the Las Vegas Strip than the six-foot trucks plastered with nearly-naked 
women. And at the same time, there is no more culturally embarrassing and 
shameful bodily function than that of menstruation.49 
 One common legal euphemism is the word “mother,” found often in preg-
nancy-related legislation and jurisprudence.50 How inappropriate, in the context 
of abortion, to discuss whether the procedure is “necessary to preserve the life 
or health of the mother”—language that presupposed that the woman in ques-
tion already is a mother, rather than a woman deciding upon a medical proce-
dure. 51 Those concerned with the equality of women urge that “[l]egislation, 
whether state or federal, should use ‘woman’. . . rather than ‘mother.’ ”52 This 
renders the “mother” an actual human being rather than the mere embodiment 
of a social or bodily function.53 In such cases, the word “women” should be 
used to specify and humanize women in the language of the law. 
D.   Uses of “Woman” to Close the Legal Gap 
Despite the historical use of the term “woman” to legally undermine the 
female sex, precedent shows that the specific term also has great power to in-
still protections.54 Legal history indicates that “not all use of gendered language 
is inappropriate,” and in fact can be helpful—but that “deliberate choices need 
to be made to avoid perpetuating gender stereotypes.”55 
For example, by 1900, each state had passed its version of the Married 
Woman’s Property Act, allowing married women some economic rights within 
marriage.56 Understanding that such rights were by no means guaranteed to 
women, single or married, California passed a law in 1862 that explicitly 
“guaranteed that a woman who made deposits in her own name was entitled to 
                                                
48  Id. 
49  See generally Tomi-Ann Roberts et al., “Feminine Protection”: The Effects of Menstrua-
tion on Attitudes Towards Women, 26 PSYCHOL. WOMEN Q. 131 (2002). 
50  See Lara M. Gardner, A Step Toward True Equality in the Workplace: Requiring Employ-
er Accommodation for Breastfeeding Women, 17 WIS. WOMEN’S L.J. 259, 288 (2002). 
51  Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 912 (1992) (emphasis added). 
52  Gardner, supra note 50, at 288. 
53  By contrast, men are less often referred to as “the father” in cases concerning, for exam-
ple, vasectomy, unless the man actually is the father of a child that has already been born. 
See, e.g., Dehn v. Edgecombe, 865 A.2d 603, 606 (Md. 2005) (using the word “father” as a 
verb, only); Speck v. Finegold, 408 A.2d 496, 505 (Pa. 1979) (using the word “father” to 
describe a man who received a vasectomy but then had a child); Hays v. Hall, 488 S.W.2d 
412, 413 (Tex. 1972) (lacking even a reference to the word “father”). 
54  Sneddon, supra note 17, at 1554. 
55  Id. at 1537. 
56  Id. at 1549. 
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keep control of the money.”57 Specifying rights by sex would not have been 
necessary had lawmakers not understood, even 150 years ago, that there are 
certain legal realities suggested by the word “woman”—and more dangerously, 
that without clarifying women as the subject of certain laws, the public may as-
sume that the law concerns men, only. 
The Married Woman’s Property Acts specifically named women in order 
to remedy past discrimination, suggesting that nineteenth and twentieth century 
lawmakers—from legal “proto”-feminists to the radical second wavers—
successfully used the word “woman” to explicitly challenge the patriarchal sys-
tem of Anglo-American common law that kept women legally subordinate to 
the men in their lives.58 This type of linguistic specificity, while perhaps seem-
ing sexist to our modern sensibilities that assume “equality” is the norm, was 
necessary to undermine the misogynistic connotations and expectations at-
tached to the word “woman.” These attachments, while significantly dimin-
ished since these early American laws, have nonetheless survived into the year 
2017.59 
Even in the mid-twentieth century, protections under Lyndon B Johnson’s 
1965 “affirmative action benefits [were not] expanded to cover women” until 
they did so explicitly in 1967.60 In what is perhaps one of the most shocking of 
coverture’s lingering effects on contemporary young women, until the Equal 
Credit Opportunity Act of 1974,61 “banks required single, widowed or divorced 
women to bring a man along to cosign any credit application.”62 Banks could 
also severely “discount the value of [women’s] wages when considering how 
much credit to grant,” a practice that obviously disadvantaged women finan-
cially when compared with men.63 Such insidiously sexist practices were ac-
ceptable in the United States as recently as forty years ago. And it was not until 
2014 that, after forty-five years of inaction, the U.S. Department of Labor “up-
dat[ed] its sex discrimination guidelines for federal contractors . . . to reduce 
                                                
57  McGee & Moore, supra note 38. 
58  Sneddon, supra note 17, at 1549; see also McGee & Moore, supra note 38. 
59  See infra Part III. 
60  Exec. Order No. 11,375, 32 Fed. Reg. 14,303 (Oct. 17, 1967) (specifying that “[i]t is de-
sirable that the equal employment opportunity programs provided for in Executive Order No. 
11246 expressly embrace discrimination on account of sex”); McGee & Moore, supra note 
38. 
61  15 U.S.C. § 1691(a) (“It shall be unlawful for any creditor to discriminate against any ap-
plicant, with respect to any aspect of a credit transaction . . . on the basis of race, color, reli-
gion, national origin, sex or marital status, or age . . . .”) (emphasis added). 
62  McGee & Moore, supra note 38. 
63  Id. 
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bias against women.”64 This belies the anti-feminist assumption that the U.S. is 
a nation where, legally, sex does not matter. 
 Similarly, it is unlikely that the contemporary wage gap between women 
and men will be remedied until woman-specific legislation is passed, forbid-
ding anything other than equal pay for women who do equal work.65 After all, 
“[c]urrent United States Supreme Court rulings, that sex discrimination need 
only be judged with intermediate scrutiny, encourage judges’ personal opinions 
of appropriate sex roles to inform their decisions and are inadequate to eradi-
cate sex stereotypes in law.”66 Once the law specifically acknowledges that em-
ployers are forbidden to pay women lesser wages than similarly situated men, 
society will question why it took the nation so long to remedy the discrepan-
cy—similar to how modern sensibilities find the sexist pre-1970s banking prac-
tices archaic. 
 The question remains: will such specificity be allowed? Or are legal femi-
nists too cautious, now, to use the word “women” even in legislation that will 
help cure the remaining areas of unquestioned, legally permitted discrimination 
against women? 
II.   THE ROOTS OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM’S MISOGYNY AND NEUROSEXISM 
 Why has legal discrimination against women thrived for so many centu-
ries? Upon what basis did lawmakers decide to treat women and men different-
ly?  
Misogyny—including the legalized misogyny that prevented women, for 
example, from voting and from owning property—is rooted in the body.67 The 
attitude may be broken down like this: women (are supposed to) give birth. 
Therefore, a woman’s natural role is in the home, taking care of her children 
(and husband, and parents, and guests, ad nauseum). Thus, she need not, for 
example, own property or engage in political or social endeavors. In this line of 
thought, woman’s capacity for pregnancy (whether the individual woman’s 
                                                
64  Jana Kasperkevic, New US Guidelines Look to Extend Protections for Female Federal 
Workers, THE GUARDIAN (Jan. 29, 2015), http://www.theguardian.com/money/2015/jan/29/ 
new-guidelines-protections-female-federal-workers [https://perma.cc/79L5-5BT9]. 
65  For a discussion of the wage gap in the U.S. in the early twenty-first century, see 50 Years 
& Counting: The Unfinished Business of Achieving Fair Pay, NAT’L WOMEN’S LAW CTR. 
(June 10, 2013), http://nwlc.org/resources/50-years-counting-unfinished-business-achieving-
fair-pay [https://perma.cc/NX7M-B74G]. 
66  Catherine Jean Archibald, De-Clothing Sex-Based Classifications—Same-Sex Marriage Is 
Just the Beginning: Achieving Formal Sex Equality in the Modern Era, 36 N. KY. L. REV. 1, 
8 (2009). 
67  See, e.g., Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women 
art. 5, Dec. 18, 1979, 1249 U.N.T.S. 17 [hereinafter CEDAW] (citing “prejudices . . . based 
on the idea of the inferiority or the superiority of either of the sexes”); ANDREA DWORKIN, 
WOMAN HATING (1974). 
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procreative ability is intact or not) and the resulting position of motherhood is 
what makes her ill-suited for full legal inclusion. 
 This sex-based oppression has occurred in every historical age, and our 
current era is no different. And its counterpart, equally insidious, is the idea that 
it is justified not only by women’s anatomical differences, but also by women’s 
very brains. 
A.   Affirming Physical Reality and Debunking Brain Sex 
The demeaning of women’s abilities beyond the sphere of the home, and 
the resulting, purposeful legal disadvantage, is based on the fear and mistrust of 
women’s bodies.68 The feminist movement has spent well over a century dis-
proving the myth that women are biologically unsuitable (whether by our anat-
omy or by the nature of our “female brains”) for social, political, religious, mil-
itary, academic, or scientific life.69 Part of the feminist fight has been 
demonstrating that female anatomy—and in particular, the capacity to become 
pregnant—does not create such steep differences in IQ, in ability, in personali-
ty, or in any other measurable area that it makes women inherently unsuitable 
for any area of private or public life.70 Rather, feminists have argued, these dif-
ferences are socially created, and thus any inequalities must have a social rem-
edy.71 Many scientists agree and pose the question: society “train[s] boys and 
girls in really different ways . . . . How much are we hard-wiring their brains 
through this learning?”72 
The myth of the quintessential “female brain” is the other side of the coin 
in sex-based discrimination. In denying women a full place as citizens, judges 
and lawmakers have relied for centuries on misogynistic assumptions about the 
female’s physical and mental strength,. The long assumption that “males are 
designed to advance civilization, females to nurture it . . . male brains, on aver-
                                                
68  For an account of the biblical and Greek mythological distrust of women and our female 
bodies, see MARILYN YALOM, A HISTORY OF THE WIFE 1–44 (2001). In Western culture, in 
particular, “Eve’s creation from Adam’s rib has fueled the age-old argument that women is 
intrinsically inferior to man.” Id. at 3. For a takedown of the historical, “scientific” proof that 
women are inferior, see generally LONDA SCHIEBINGER, NATURE’S BODY: GENDER IN THE 
MAKING OF MODERN SCIENCE (Rutgers Univ. Press 2d ed. 2004) (1993). See generally 
NANCY TUANA, THE LESS NOBLE SEX (1993). 
69  See, e.g., Sharon Begley, He, Once a She, Offers Own View on Science Spat, WALL ST. J. 
(July 13, 2006), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB115274744775305134#articleTabs%3Darti 
cle [https://perma.cc/SWE6-KJHX]. 
70  Bobbi J. Carothers & Harry T. Reis, Men and Women Are from Earth: Examining the La-
tent Structure of Gender, 104 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 385, 403 (2013); see also 
infra Part II.B. 
71  See infra Part II.B. 
72  Lise Eliot, Sex, Brain, and Culture: The Science and Pseudoscience of Gender Difference, 
at 36:06, YouTube (Jan. 29, 2015), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=t81VjoPMhas 
[https://perma.cc/6AXW-CUWZ]. 
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age, to understand the world, female brains to understand people” has held back 
women’s advancement in society since this nation’s founding, and before.73 In-
deed, “neurological explanations and justifications for the status quo are as old 
as brain science itself, and are continuously renewed.”74 Even when a sexist 
scientific hypothesis is disproven, “another one is there to take its place . . . . 
For feminists, this means that every generation has to take up a fight that is 
both new, and old.”75 
Despite what some postmodernism thinkers claim, “modern medical sci-
ence”76 does not disavow the reality of sexual dimorphism. Bodies, with very 
rare exceptions,77 are sexed. And it is the female sex that has suffered—in 
many spheres including the legal—due to the capacity to give birth.78 This legal 
disparity survives—for example, in the push by judges who vowed in all other 
areas to uphold stare decisis but who then vowed to “overturn” the precedent of 
women’s right to abortion.79 And yet, postmodern legal scholars attempt to sep-
arate sex from legal discrimination, for example by writing about transgender 
people as “the poster children for the new sex discrimination”80—suggesting 
that “plain old” sex discrimination is somehow a worry of the past. Part IV, in-
fra, demonstrates that this is not so.81 
                                                
73  Cordelia Fine, How the New Neurosexism Helps Sustain the Status Quo, at 18:04, 
YOUTUBE (Nov. 11, 2011), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZgE8p6n9Z7o [https://perm 
a.cc/6WEX-W924]. 
74  Id. at 14:25. 
75  Id. at 14:41. 
76  See M. Dru Levasseur, Gender Identity Defines Sex: Updating the Law to Reflect Modern 
Medical Science is Key to Transgender Rights, 39 VT. L. REV. 943, 980 (2015). 
77  Thorough research estimates the intersex population at about 0.05 percent of the popula-
tion when considering genital variation, and as high as 0.2 percent of the population when 
considering other, more subtle conditions such as Klinefelter and androgen insensitivity. See 
How Common Is Intersex?, INTERSEX SOC’Y OF N. AM., http://www.isna.org/faq/frequency 
[https://perma.cc/U2DF-7JSV]. 
78  See supra Part I; infra Part III. 
79  First Among Equals, by Kenneth Starr: On Abortion, ON THE ISSUES, http://www.ontheis 
sues.org/Archive/First_Among_Equals_Abortion.htm [https://perma.cc/2FDU-T6WB] (last 
visited Mar. 28, 2017) (“Antonin Scalia: Opposes Roe v. Wade despite stare decisis prece-
dent”). 
80  Zachary A. Kramer, The New Sex Discrimination, 63 DUKE L.J. 891, 912 (2014). 
81  I find the idea of a “new” sex discrimination, taking the focus away from women—who 
founded and still very much need a movement against sex discrimination—as offensive and 
legally unsound as the idea that lesbian/gay/bisexual rights somehow constitute “the new 
civil rights movement,” when black people and others of color still very much struggle for 
their rights. The LGBT (Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender—sometimes intersex and 
asexual communities choose to consider themselves part of this acronym) movement is its 
own movement, though it may borrow from, lend to, and run concurrently with the civil 
rights movement. In the same way, movements for intersex and transgender rights, as com-
plicated and “new” in precedent as they are, should not be subsumed into—or worse, over-
shadow—existing paradigms of sex discrimination, despite any parallels. 
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What modern medical science does debunk is the concept of “brain sex”: 
that sex-stereotyped mind, from which the so-called “natural timidity” of wom-
en stems. And it is scientists—not courts, as one writer claims—who have the 
capacity to determine whether brain sex is real, and thus whether the law 
should classify individuals based on upon it: that is, whether “gender identity or 
self-identity is biologically based and a core, immutable factor.”82 Courts 
should rely on the most up-to-date, solid research when they write decisions—
not on media hype and half-explained scientific texts. As stated by Dr. Lise El-
iot, “we hear a lot about gender and the brain, but . . . . [t]he media loves a con-
troversy, and the media loves noise. And so the media often makes a lot more 
noise about gender and the brain than actually exists in our research.”83 The 
“pop-science version of brain sex” may be “where the money” is, but courts 
must not be mislead by titles like Why Men Don’t Listen and Why Women 
Can’t Read Maps.84 
Good science shows that brain sex does not exist—and is therefore an in-
appropriate model for determining one’s legal status.85 The language of the 
“female brain” has been used—historically, improperly—to deny women rights 
to employment and education—Myra Bradwell the ability to practice law86 and 
other women the ability to attend the Virginia Military Institute (VMI), at least 
until legal feminist Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg refused to accept reliance on 
old stereotypes to exclude women from VMI’s “adversative method of train-
ing” in 1996.87 But, simply put, there is no such thing as a female brain.88 
Even today, stereotypical differences are exaggerated, and the plasticity of 
the brain is vastly underestimated.89 Though the sizes of female and male brains 
may differ, large-scale studies show that sex differences in specific structures 
are “minute” when corrected for overall brain size.90 This is true even in behav-
ioral studies, where much of the supposed “hard-wired” differences between 
women and men have been found.91 For example, a test of nineteen female and 
nineteen male subjects showed a difference in one language task out of three, 
                                                
82  Levasseur, supra note 76, at 980–81 n.214. 
83  Eliot, supra note 72, at 4:36. 
84  Id. at 7:28. 
85  For several articles discussing this idea from the point of view of contemporary feminists, 
see generally Brain Sex Does Not Exist, SEX MATTERS, http://sexnotgender.com/brain-sex-
does-not-exist [https://perma.cc/2FL6-SGGH] (last visited Mar. 28, 2017). 
86  See generally Bradwell v. State, 83 U.S. 130 (1872). 
87  See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 540, 542–43 (1996). 
88  Eliot, supra note 72, at 26:26. 
89  Christopher Bergland, The Male and Female Brain Are More Similar than Once Assumed, 
PSYCHOL. TODAY (Nov. 2, 2015), https://www.psychologytoday.com/blog/the-athletes-way/ 
201511/the-male-and-female-brain-are-more-similar-once-assumed [https://perma.cc/VQ4S-
WZ6M]. 
90  Eliot, supra note 72, at 38:37–39:19. 
91  Id. at 42:00–43:00. 
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and it has been cited over 1,200 times; but research since then, including a me-
ta-analysis that examined a much larger number of subjects, demonstrates abso-
lutely no difference in language task ability between the sexes—that meta-
analysis being cited only about 100 times.92 “Even in textbooks today, [authors] 
continue” to cite the older, smaller studies, and not the updated science.93  
Additionally, brains actually change due to experience. Take these two ex-
amples: First, the brains of taxi drivers in London physically develop, adding 
gray matter and assisting them in storing vast amounts of navigational infor-
mation; and the longer cabbies work, the larger their hippocampuses grow.94 
Second, one study wherein “the individuals only differed in the religion in 
which they were reared” yielded extremely different brain scan results. The 
way human beings are raised certainly affects these seemingly “biological” dif-
ferences.95 
Neuroscientific studies, specifically those claiming that the brain dictates 
sex, have been widely debated and disputed for various methodological flaws.96 
Furthermore, scientists’ own sexist and political biases affect their research—
and these biases often see sex differences where there are none.97 Brain studies 
may rely upon “spurious” or chance results that exaggerate difference, or that 
fail to report when there is no observable difference.98 A 2005 Yale University 
study claiming brain differences in language processing had a sample size of 
only thirty-eight; it was debunked by a later lateral study with a sample size of 
over 2,000.99 Even observed differences in structures, or in brain activity light-
ing up on an MRI, might not actually mean anything at all—but scientists at-
tribute meaning to them based on their biases.100 These differences are then ex-
aggerated by a society that relies upon and even delights in gender roles, whose 
own sexist bias is then confirmed. 
The troubling implication of ignoring up-to-date brain science is that the 
conclusions society comes to about the so-called scientifically proven “sex” of 
                                                
92  Id. 
93  Id. at 43:00. 
94  Taxi Drivers’ Brains ‘Grow’ on the Job, BBC NEWS (Mar. 14, 2000, 3:51 PM), http://new 
s.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/677048.stm [https://perma.cc/A22A-2EB3]. 
95  Eliot, supra note 72, at 45:51–46:17. 
96  See generally REBECCA M. JORDAN-YOUNG, BRAIN STORM: THE FLAWS IN THE SCIENCE OF 
SEX DIFFERENCES (2010); Katherine S. Button et al., Power Failure: Why Small Sample Size 
Undermines the Reliability of Neuroscience, 14 NATURE REVIEWS: NEUROSCIENCE 365 
(2013), http://www.nature.com/nrn/journal/v14/n5/full/nrn3475.html [https://perma.cc/RRK 
2-REZR]. See also Eliot, supra note 72, at 19:21, 19:55 (citing a study in which “sex differ-
ences” could not be discerned in the brain at 500 subjects, but in which “very, very tiny” sex 
differences were suggested at 1,000 subjects). 
97  See Fine, supra note 73, at 22:54–23:05. 
98  Id. at 20:24–21:10. 
99  Id. at 21:46–23:58. 
100  Eliot, supra note 72, at 10:27, 16:55, 18:28, 19:21, 19:55. 
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our brains “has political implications.”101 Just like the Bradwell decision, pseu-
do-science about sex differences in the brain have spawned policy decisions 
that impact the next generation; for example, Dr. Lise Eliot calls out authors 
who make “authoritative” claims based on studies that are either faulty, or 
which have been misinterpreted by the media—claims that then impact the way 
schoolchildren are taught.102 Leonard Sax, who wrote an education-based book 
called Why Gender Matters, “has a little footnote to cite this claim, and the 
claim is based on one teeny little study with nine boys and ten girls,” not even 
looking at the area (emotion) on which the author makes his claim.103 “He’s us-
ing these ideas about sex, these claims . . . to actually advocate for gender seg-
regation” in public education, an idea which has had “a very fast growth trajec-
tory in our public schools in the last ten years.”104 Indeed, “he uses our taxpayer 
dollars . . . to train our schoolteachers in this gender pseudo-science”—meaning 
that the pop science about brain sex is having a negative legal impact on our 
children even now.105 
Postmodern thinkers will undoubtedly agree with Sax: in particular, those 
who believe that “gender identity,” meaning the internal sense of being a wom-
an or man, “is ‘biological’ and the primary determinant of sex.”106 Such gender 
theorists often use the famous but discredited 1995 study by Zhou et al. to 
prove the soundness of the brain-sex model.107 The Zhou study claimed to 
demonstrate steep differences between biological males who identified as men 
and those who identified as transgender women.108 It has since been de-
bunked.109 Not only was its small sample size problematic, but its flawed meth-
odology measured brain differences only of transgender women who, as adults, 
had been on artificial sex-reassignment hormones, one of the factors in brain 
plasticity, for many years.110 Other recent studies demonstrate that this small 
sampling size has been a problem in brain research in general, and that the big-
ger picture shows that differences in brain structure and function are negligible 
if indeed they exist at all.111 Indeed, regarding transgender people, “brain re-
                                                
101  Fine, supra note 73, at 18:54–19:27. 
102  Eliot, supra note 72, at 9:50. 
103  Id. at 10:06–10:46. 
104  Id. at 13:07. 
105  Id. at 13:36. 
106  Levasseur, supra note 76, at 980. 
107  Jiang-Ning Zhou et al., A Sex Difference in the Human Brain and its Relation to Trans-
sexuality, 378 NATURE 68 (1995). 
108  Id. 
109  See Anne A. Lawrence, A Critique of the Brain-Sex Theory of Transsexualism, DR. ANNE 
LAWRENCE ON TRANSSEXUALISM AND SEXUALITY (2007), http://www.annelawrence.com/brai 
n-sex_critique.html [https://perma.cc/4XNV-5C3R]. 
110  Id. 
111  Bergland, supra note 88. For a further discussion of exaggerated differences in female 
and male brains and the trouble these assumed differences have caused, see generally LISE 
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search hasn’t really caught up yet” to the large-scale meta-analyses that have 
disproven brain-sex differences.112 
Alternately, postmodern gender theorists may rely upon the famous but 
misinterpreted case of David Rhymer.113 Rhymer’s circumcision resulted in an 
accidental amputation of his genitals; he was raised as a girl, but was never 
happy as a girl.114 But this is not the full story of male infants who suffer a cir-
cumcision accident or a congenital defect and are then raised as girls.115 Rhym-
er was switched to a “female identity” at two years old.116 On the other hand, 
“the majority” of male infants who are switched to a female “identity” while 
they are still infants are “happy with their female identity.”117 
Thus, although “gender,” in the sense of personality and conformance with 
or resistance to sex stereotypes, may be “truly between the ears, not between 
the legs,”118 sex is not between the ears. It is a physical reality with material 
and legal consequences, especially for women. Thus, those who “endorse[] 
gender identity as the sole criterion for legal sex”119 have been severely misled 
by bad science and pop psychology. 
Because “science enjoys great authority in our society,” legal feminists 
should beware of this shoddy science and how it impacts the legal movement 
toward sex equity.120 Legal feminists must acknowledge that “neurosexism is 
slowing us down” in terms of progress toward true legal and social equality.121 
Indeed, as even the proponents of the legal brain-sex model admit, 
“[i]ncorporation of an understanding of sex-based neurological and cognitive 
differences could serve as a backdoor for legal discrimination against women 
premised on ‘scientific fact.’ ”122 In determining whether such a result would be 
acceptable, society might well consider a question posed so poignantly by Pro-
fessor Cordelia Fine: “What does it say about political values, that we seem to 
care so little” that the science of sex differences in the brain is not always—or 
even usually—sound?123 
                                                                                                             
ELIOT, PINK BRAIN, BLUE BRAIN: HOW SMALL DIFFERENCES GROW INTO TROUBLESOME 
GAPS— AND WHAT WE CAN DO ABOUT IT (2010). 
112  Eliot, supra note 72, at 1:12:38. 
113  Id. at 34:49. 
114  Id. at 34:55. 
115  Id. at 35:20. 
116  Id. at 35:17. 
117  Id. at 35:43. 
118  Blaise Vanderhorst, Whither Lies the Self: Intersex and Transgender Individuals and a 
Proposal for Brain-Based Legal Sex, 9 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 241, 245 (2015). 
119  Id. 
120  Fine, supra note 73, at 50:45. 
121  Id. at 51:57. 
122  Vanderhorst, supra note 117, at 272. 
123  Fine, supra note 73, at 35:40. 
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B.   Legalized Neurosexism 
Neurosexism, a relatively new term that might be used to describe the age-
old sex-stereotyping of the Bradwell decision and that today describes such 
gender propaganda pieces as Men Are from Mars, Women Are from Venus,124 
draws attention to the mistaken belief that because women and men are biolog-
ically different, their brains function in different ways—and that these differ-
ences are what make human beings “women” and “men,” respectively.125 It is 
true that there are some measurable differences in brain mass due to different 
cranial sizes among the sexes.126 In addition, like the London taxi drivers, the 
brains of women and men develop differently due to different societal expecta-
tions and experiences.127 Neural plasticity does lead to differences between the 
brains of the sexes by the time an individual reaches adulthood.128 Indeed, 
“learning and plasticity are a much greater determinate” of sex differences in 
behavior.129 However, there is no inherent difference in ability, IQ, personality, 
taste, or any subjective characteristic of the individual determined by a “sexed” 
brain.130  
When scientists exaggerate or even fabricate brain-sex differences—when 
they give in to neurosexism—“they license others to do the same.”131 Educa-
tors, businesspeople, and lawmakers “are listening” when scientists claim 
“hard-wired differences” in female and male brains.132 Faulty studies of brain 
sex have led even respected Cambridge scholars to suggest that women are 
simply intrinsically less able to do hard science and math.133 This, of course, 
has political and legal implications. How might such studies impact constitu-
tional equal protection issues—especially given that, according to Supreme 
Court jurisprudence, when there is a disagreement among scientists, states are 
permitted to choose the interpretation they will enshrine in the law?134 
It should concern legal feminists that neurosexist assumptions might be so 
enshrined. This is especially true given that those who believe gender differ-
                                                
124  See generally JOHN GRAY, MEN ARE FROM MARS, WOMEN ARE FROM VENUS (20th anniv. 
ed. 2012) (1992). Interestingly, Gray “is still a huge industry, even though the place he got 
his Ph.D. from was never accredited . . . .” Eliot, supra note 72, at 9:25. 
125  See CORDELIA FINE, DELUSIONS OF GENDER xviii (2011). 
126  See id. at xxiv, 143. See generally JORDAN-YOUNG, supra note 95. 
127  FINE, supra note 134, at 236. 
128  See id. 
129  Eliot, supra note 72, at 28:08. 
130  See generally FINE, supra note 134. 
131  Eliot, supra note 72, at 31:02. 
132  Id. at 34:45. 
133  Id. at 25:54. 
134  See Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 163 (2007) (affirming that “[t]he Court has given 
state and federal legislatures wide discretion to pass legislation in areas where there is medi-
cal and scientific uncertainty”). 
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ences are hard-wired are “more confident that society treats women fairly.”135 
This has obvious political and legal ramifications. Why fight for women’s legal 
equality if it already exists? Or that, given our “female brains,” women have 
already come as far as we can? But legal feminists know this is not true.136 
Thus, the brain-sex model should be of concern. 
Legal feminists have relied on the unscientific nature of the once-
undisputed concept of stereotypical sex differences—successfully—to advocate 
for women’s full personhood under the law.137 They have demonstrated that re-
lying on biology is inappropriate in legislating, except where there are anatomi-
cal or historical reasons for doing so (e.g., pregnancy accommodations, or rem-
edying historical discrimination against women).138 “[J]ustifying differential 
treatment by citing differences in neural anatomy or function” is equally inex-
cusable—because it is not anatomically accurate to rely on the “sexed brain” 
model.139 In fact, that is the very model against which legal feminists have 
fought. 
For example, it is the neurosexist belief that women are not equipped for 
certain of life’s less delicate experiences that drove Justice Kennedy to sug-
gest—not even a decade ago—that women’s mental health needs special atten-
tion in abortion matters, lest the woman suffer “severe depression and loss of 
esteem.”140 Justice Ginsburg rightly criticized this focus on women’s “fragile 
emotional state.”141 Justice Kennedy’s assertion of fragility is unsustainable; 
though the number is impossible to pin down with certainty, approximately 1.5 
percent of women of childbearing age have an abortion every year—and re-
search suggests that as many as 30 percent of American women undergoes the 
procedure at some point in her lifetime.142 Surely, such a large portion of Amer-
                                                
135  FINE, supra note 134, at 185. 
136  See infra Part III.A. 
137  See, e.g., Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm’n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376, 
391 (1973) (prohibiting advertising jobs by indicating the sex of the hiree); Roe v. Wade, 
410 U.S. 113, 114 (1973) (affirming women’s constitutional right to abortion); Phillips v. 
Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542, 544 (1971) (relying on Title VII to prohibit employers 
from refusing to hire women with small children despite hiring men with small children). 
138  See, e.g., United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 556 (1996) (requiring an “exceedingly 
persuasive justification” for differing treatment of the sexes, and rejecting gender stereotypes 
as being exceedingly persuasive). 
139  Bobbi Carothers & Harry Reis, The Tangle of the Sexes, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 20, 2013), 
https://nyti.ms/2kjKVrO [https://perma.cc/W5KA-GAQU]. 
140  Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 159 (2007). The decision to get an abortion has been 
said, somewhat condescendingly, to be “a decision so fraught with emotional consequence.” 
Id. 
141  Id. at 183–84 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).  
142  See, e.g., William Robert Johnston, Percentage of United States Women Who Have Had 
Abortions, JOHNSTON ARCHIVE, http://www.johnstonsarchive.net/policy/abortion/uslifetime 
ab.html [https://perma.cc/UJS2-B8QW] (last visited Mar. 29, 2017); 1 IN 3, http://www.1in3 
campaign.org [https://perma.cc/9TRD-R5K4] (last visited Mar. 29, 2017); Induced Abortion 
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ican women do not suffer from “severe” mental illness as the result of a routine 
procedure. 
It is also neurosexism that allows states such as Arizona and Arkansas not 
merely to permit but to mandate that doctors give women “misleading infor-
mation” about the abortion procedure.143 For millennia, misogynistic thinking 
has assumed that the female mind is easily misled—and furthermore, that if it is 
misled, it can only be to her good, because her life should be directed for her.144 
The assumption is that somehow, she cannot know her own greater good.145 
It would be a fatal blow to all feminisms to further legalize neurosexism, 
based as it is upon a scientifically indefensible conclusion.146 “Language use 
constructs reality,” and constructing legal reality with brain-sex language has 
already harmed many women.147 Women are not women because we have a 
“female brain”; and we do not suffer the legal misogyny that, for example, de-
nies them the right to abortion, contraception, or female-specific medical care 
because of their “female brains.” Women suffer this legal misogyny due to the 
double-sided coin of female anatomy and the assumption that “female brains” 
limit women’s abilities.  
This is why it is vital that legal feminists maintain woman-specific lan-
guage when addressing these—and any other—women’s issues. The legislature 
and judiciary must not be allowed to give effect to stereotypical thinking of the 
kind that claims women, by their anatomy or neurology, are “just always . . . 
very sensitive”148—“naturally timid”—or any other stereotypically feminine 
description. This kind of thinking has already damaged women’s position in the 
law, and we are only now undoing that damage.  
“The Constitution cannot control such prejudices but neither can it tolerate 
them. Private biases may be outside the reach of the law, but the law cannot, 
directly or indirectly, give them effect.”149 The law cannot tolerate a postmod-
ern interpretation of brain sex that may well send the women’s movement back 
decades. It cannot permit stereotypical sex differences to reinsert themselves as 
                                                                                                             
in the United States, GUTTMACHER INST. https://www.guttmacher.org/fact-sheet/induced-a 
bortion-united-states [https://perma.cc/W9QU-XSHE] (last visited Mar. 29, 2017). 
143  Editorial, The Reproductive Rights Rollback of 2015, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 19, 2015), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/20/opinion/sunday/the-reproductive-rights-rollback-of-20 
15.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/N76V-TWZM]. 
144  For discussions of legal paternalism toward women, see Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 
U.S. 677, 684 (1973); IN TENDER CONSIDERATION: WOMEN, FAMILIES, AND THE LAW IN 
ABRAHAM LINCOLN'S ILLINOIS 5 (Daniel W. Stowell ed., 2002); Kim Dayton, Patriarchy, 
Paternalism, and the Masks of “Fetal Protection”: Response to John P. Kennedy, 2 KAN. 
J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 25, 29 (1992). 
145  Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 684. 
146  Sneddon, supra note 17, at 1539 n.17. 
147  See id. at 1538. 
148  JANET MOCK, REDEFINING REALNESS 22 (2014). 
149  Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 433 (1984). 
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legal realities under a shoddy scientific framework that insists that “suddenly 
we’re no longer being old-fashioned and sexist: we’re being modern and scien-
tific.”150 
III.   MISOGYNY BY ANY OTHER NAME 
A.   The Material Reality of Sex-Based Discrimination 
The world, let alone the United States, has not evolved so much that femi-
nism is irrelevant. Historical and current cultural attitudes, in addition to the 
material reality of being female, necessitate continued feminist struggle: that is, 
a movement centering on females. Today, women are still the overwhelming 
majority at risk of trafficking, sexual assault, domestic violence, and murder by 
intimate partners151—not to mention illiteracy,152 wage discrimination,153 disad-
vantaged employment opportunities due to family structure,154 sexual harass-
ment,155 unpaid domestic labor,156 being silenced in the workplace and social-
                                                
150  See Fine, supra note 73, at 46:33. 
151  See generally NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, Selected Research Results 
on Violence Against Women (2007), https://www.nij.gov/topics/crime/violence-against-wo 
men/pages/selected-results.aspx [https://perma.cc/BK4W-VX6V] (clarifying that “8.1 per-
cent of surveyed women and 2.2 percent of surveyed men reported being stalked . . . . Wom-
en experience more intimate partner violence . . . 22.1 percent of surveyed women, com-
pared with 7.4 percent of surveyed men . . . . [And, w]omen are significantly more likely 
than men to be injured during an assault”). See DIANE KIESEL, DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: LAW, 
POLICY, AND PRACTICE 2–4 (2007) (noting that “approximately 1,000 women each year 
killed by their husbands or intimate partners,” that “the majority of the victims [are] female,” 
and that “women accounted for 84 percent of all spouse abuse victims and 86 percent of all 
intimate partner victims . . . . Three-fourths of all domestic violence perpetrators are male . . . 
. [A]n ugly—and accepted—fact of life for a very long time.” Attitudes of violence against 
women are age-old, and it is these “popular attitudes . . . [that] have permeated popular cul-
ture, legislation and law”); Kathleen Waits, The Criminal Justice System’s Response to Bat-
tering: Understanding the Problem, Forging the Solutions, 60 WASH. L. REV. 267, 288 
(1985) (clarifying that “[h]e is violent at home . . . because he can get away with it, as long 
as society does not intervene”); Intimate Partner Violence Facts and Resources, AM. 
PSYCHOLOGICAL ASS’N, http://www.apa.org/topics/violence/partner.aspx?item=2 
[https://perma.cc/6LQE-9E8Y] (last visited Mar. 29, 2017) (specifying that “74 percent of 
all murder-suicides involved an intimate partner . . . . Of these, 96 percent were women 
killed by their intimate partners”). 
152  International Literacy Day 2013, UNESCO INST. FOR STAT., http://www.uis.unesco.org/ 
literacy/Documents/Intl-literacy-day/literacy-infographic-2013-en.pdf [https://perma.cc/RFK 
8-JLVN] (last visited Mar. 29, 2017). 
153  Behrooz Kalantari, The Influence of Social Values and Childhood Socialization on Occu-
pational Gender Segregation and Wage Disparity, 41 PUB. PERSONNEL MGMT. 241, 241 
(2012) (“[A]lthough female participation in the paid workforce has increased, overall wom-
en’s wages relative to men’s has not.”). 
154  See Deborah L. Brake & Joanna L. Grossman, Unprotected Sex: The Pregnancy Discrim-
ination Act at 35, 21 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 67, 68 (2013). 
155  Timeline for Development of Sexual Harassment Laws, MINN. ST. U. MANKATO, 
https://mavdisk.mnsu.edu/howard/Mgmt%20440%20Spring%202008%20Timeline%20for%
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ly,157 and a decreased likelihood that their medical issues will be seen to, diag-
nosed, or that medicines prescribed are appropriate for the female body.158 And 
men as a class still benefit—materially, legally, and emotionally—from a patri-
archal system of male privilege.159 Many other demographic categories suffer 
or benefit along similar lines of structural privilege and oppression: for exam-
ple, based on race, ability, sexuality, or socioeconomic class.160 While ac-
knowledging that all of these and more can intersect with and compound sex 
discrimination, this Part focuses on the current legal necessity of discussing 
sex-based discrimination with woman-specific language. 
 The material reality must be acknowledged: the root of the global patriar-
chy is the view of women as reproductive resource, physically and neurologi-
cally unequipped for a life outside of that role.161 Most legal systems in the 
world have impacted and been impacted by this view.162 Because of this histo-
ry, and because “[p]hysical differences between men and women . . . are endur-
ing,”163 laws aimed at combatting misogyny should use women-specific lan-
guage. Abortion, pregnancy, and other female health issues, in particular, must 
remain women’s issues—as they impact us directly. Such laws must refer to 
                                                                                                             
20development%20of%20sexual%20harassment%20law%20in%20US.htm [https://perma.c 
c/C6LK-VUZ4] (last visited Mar. 29, 2017). There is a long history of sexual harassment 
against women in the workplace. This is not to say that the reverse does not occur. But the 
sexualized treatment of women is a cultural institution, and undoubtedly stems at least partly 
from the perception that women do not belong in the workplace—or that if they do, it is only 
natural that their belonging is sexualized. Id. 
156  Breanne Fahs, Second Shifts and Political Awakenings: Divorce and the Political Social-
ization of Middle-Aged Women, 47 J. DIVORCE & REMARRIAGE 43, 48 (2007). 
157  Alice Robb, Why Men Are Prone to Interrupting Women, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 19, 2015), 
http://nytlive.nytimes.com/womenintheworld/2015/03/19/google-chief-blasted-for-repeated 
ly-interrupting-female-government-official [https://perma.cc/WME5-WTW3]. 
158  See, e.g., Anke Bueter, Androcentrism, Feminism, and Pluralism in Medicine, TOPOI 1–
10 (2015); Amelia Hill, Doctors are ‘Failing to Spot Asperger’s in Girls’, THE GUARDIAN 
(Apr. 11, 2009), http://www.theguardian.com/lifeandstyle/2009/apr/12/autism-aspergers-
girls [https://perma.cc/X9UU-K6GN]; Alyson McGregor, Why Medicine Often Has Danger-
ous Side Effects for Women, TED (Sept. 2014), https://www.ted.com/talks/alyson_mcgreg 
or_why_medicine_often_has_dangerous_side_effects_for_women?language=en [https://per 
ma.cc/Y8P5-EQ8Q]. 
159  See generally McCarroll, supra note 11. See Kim A. Case et al., Reflecting on Hetero-
sexual and Male Privilege: Interventions to Raise Awareness, 20 J. SOC. ISSUES 722 (2014). 
160  See, e.g., Iris Marion Young, Five Faces of Oppression, in GEOGRAPHIC THOUGHT: A 
PRAXIS PERSPECTIVE 61–63 (George Henderson & Marvin Waterstone  eds., 2009). 
161  See, e.g., Bradwell v. State, 83 U.S. 130, 141–42 (1872) (Bradley, J., concurring); supra 
Part II. See SUSAN BROWNMILLER, AGAINST OUR WILL: MEN, WOMEN AND RAPE 17 (1975) 
(“[T]hose who did assume the historic burden of her protection . . . reduced her status to that 
of chattel. The historic price of woman’s protection by man against man was the imposition 
of chastity and monogamy . . . . Man’s forcible extension of his boundaries to his mate and 
later to their offspring was the beginning of his concept of ownership.”). 
162  The historical roots of the institutions of marriage come to mind. See, e.g., Obergefell v. 
Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2595 (2015). 
163  United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533 (1996). 
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women, and not shy away from the word out of fear—as even the Supreme 
Court does in its abortion jurisprudence.164 Judicial and legislative language 
that dismisses discrimination against those with female anatomy—and in par-
ticular that which dismisses it as something other than sex discrimination, as in 
Geduldig—should not be tolerated. Indeed, legal feminists must insist upon 
linguistic precision when discussing women’s issues as women’s issues. 
The ability to become pregnant is as dangerous legally as it is physically. 
Not only must pregnant women contend with the risks of permanent bodily 
changes, depression, preeclampsia, gestational diabetes, and maternal death;165 
they must also navigate a world of (predominantly male) lawmakers who de-
cide issues of healthcare and abortion access, custody, and family structure. 
Fortunately, the Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978 reversed Geduldig, with 
its sexist mental gymnastics.166 But the risk of dangerous, anti-female law is not 
at an end. For example, the right to control the “number and spacing” of chil-
dren—for example by terminating an unwanted (or dangerous) pregnancy—is 
internationally recognized as a fundamental human right of women.167 In the 
current American climate both of restricted access to birth control—restrictions 
stemming from social, religious, and political sources168—and of sub-par edu-
cation on sex (both intercourse169 and anatomy170), women have a high likeli-
                                                
164  Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992). Legal feminists, especially, must en-
sure that amidst the various strains of identity on which it is important to focus, we do not 
lose our feminist focus: the liberation of women. Unfortunately, feminists who acknowledge 
sex-based discrimination are being negatively targeted for writing with specificity. For a dis-
cussion of the harassment suffered by women who refer to biological reality rather than ad-
here to the tautological definitions of postmodern identity politics (e.g. “a woman is anyone 
who identifies as a woman”), see infra Part III.D. 
165  See, e.g., Pregnancy Complications, OFFICE ON WOMEN’S HEALTH, U.S. DEP’T OF 
HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., http://womenshealth.gov/pregnancy/you-are-pregnant/pregnan 
cy-complications.html [https://perma.cc/HNA8-BWVV] (last visited Mar. 29, 2017). 
166  See Brake & Grossman, supra note 164, at 67. 
167  CEDAW, supra note 67. 
168  See generally Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014). See Jo Jones 
et al., CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL, Current Contraceptive Use in the United States, 2006–
2010, and Changes in Patterns of Use Since 1995, at 6, 10–11, (2012), www.cdc.gov/nchs/ 
data/nhsr/nhsr060.pdf#x2013;2010,%20and%20Changes%20in%20Patterns%20of%20Use 
%20Since%201995,%20table%201%20[PDF%20-%20443%20KB]%3C/a%3E [https://per 
ma.cc/8JW3-L5DD]. 
169  In many states—even in progressive California, where this author’s sex education con-
sisted only of scare-tactic photos of STD symptoms, without the knowledge of how they 
could be contracted, let alone prevented—sex education is less than thorough. See Beck 
Devine, Sex Ed in High School Lacking, DAKOTA STUDENT (Feb. 12, 2016) 
http://dakotastudent.com/7544/opinion/sex-ed-in-high-school-lacking [https://perma.cc/3PP 
2-F8D6]. And though President Obama attempted to end the practice, the federal govern-
ment has “provided millions of federal dollars each year only to programs that follow a nar-
row abstinence-only-until-marriage curricula,” leaving young people with no knowledge as 
to birth control or sex-safety methods. Leah J. Tulin, Can International Human Rights Law 
Countenance Federal Funding of Abstinence-Only Education?, 95 GEO. L.J. 1979, 1980 
 
17 NEV. L.J. 667 ORWOLL -FINAL.DOCX 5/10/17  1:12 PM 
Summer 2017] PREGNANT PERSONS 691 
hood of aborting a pregnancy; while it is impossible to give an exact figure of 
the proportion of women who will have an abortion in their lifetimes, it is tell-
ing that “[n]ineteen percent of pregnancies (excluding miscarriages) in 2014 
ended in abortion.”171 And yet, from 2011 to 2015, “no fewer than 288” laws 
designed to limit women’s access to abortion were passed.172 This chipping 
away at access to abortion is a direct assault not on some small fringe of imagi-
nary, irresponsible females, but on a large proportion of women.173 
The author and other legal feminists such as Elizabeth Hungerford argue 
that this rise in targeted legal action against women is at least partly due to 
movements of postmodernist identity politics, and the rising practice of defang-
ing the language used to define discrete populations.174 Though due cumula-
tively to a myriad of factors, from religious and political conservatism to the 
fact that women’s biological issues are only now becoming appropriate to dis-
cuss in polite company, the rise in legal attacks on women demonstrates that, 
now more than ever, legal feminists must not abandon women-specific lan-
guage in the fight against legalized misogyny. 
B.   The Danger in Combating Reality with Defanged Postmodern 
Language 
The linguistic obfuscation that aims to ignore the biological roots of mi-
sogyny is by no means rare. The Geduldig decision in the 1970s was merely a 
preview of the current derailing tactics trying to take such legal issues as abor-
tion out of the purview of “women’s issues.” Cathy Brennan and Elizabeth 
Hungerford, in a 2011 letter to the United Nations and a 2012 follow-up by 
Hungerford alone, suggested that the recent onslaught of “gender identity” leg-
islation makes it impossible to discuss the biological roots of sex-based dis-
crimination and oppression.175 Hungerford’s letters, in particular, demonstrate 
                                                                                                             
(2007); Kevin Mathews, Obama Attempts to Dump Federal Funding for Abstinence-Only 
Education, CARE2 (Feb. 20, 2016), http://www.care2.com/causes/obama-attempts-to-dump-
federal-funding-for-abstinence-only-education.html#ixzz40xqISHNW [https://perma.cc/M8 
N7-P5XB]. 
170  See, e.g., MYRA SADKER & DAVID SADKER, FAILING AT FAIRNESS: HOW AMERICA’S 
SCHOOLS CHEAT GIRLS 190–91 (2010); Susan Morgan et al., Sexism and Anatomy, as Dis-
cerned in Textbooks and as Perceived by Medical Students at Cardiff University and Univer-
sity of Paris Descartes, 224 J. ANATOMY 352 (2014). 
171   GUTTMACHER INST., supra note 151 (emphasis added). 
172  The Reproductive Rights Rollback of 2015, supra note 142. 
173  GUTTMACHER INSTITUTE, supra note 151. 
174  See CAROLYN D’CRUZ, IDENTITY POLITICS IN DECONSTRUCTION 1–3 (2008); infra Part 
III.B. 
175  Letter from Cathy Brennan & Elizabeth Hungerford, Esqs., to CSW Communications 
Procedure, Human Rights Section, UN Women (Aug. 1, 2011), https://genderidentity 
watch.files.wordpress.com/2012/09/communication_csw_un_brennanhungerford_08012011
_.pdf [https://perma.cc/NN46-JM8N] [hereinafter August 1st Letter]; Letter from Elizabeth 
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that especially in this climate of expanding identity and shifting legal defini-
tions, it is vital to keep in mind the historic discrimination against women as a 
sex class,176 and to maintain historically important terminology. 
 Legal feminists must use precise, technical terms when discussing sex-
based discrimination—given the reality discussed supra that unites all wom-
en.177 Feminism as a movement has rightfully evolved from an effort aimed at 
preserving the rights and privileges of wealthy white women,178 to a multifacet-
ed movement. Women of color, working-class women, lesbians, and disabled 
women, in particular, have contributed to this expansion.179 Though there is still 
much to be done for these and other special populations,180 various strains of 
feminism have emerged to answer the needs of specific populations of women: 
strains including radical, liberal, Black, Marxist, lesbian, legal, and many others 
“feminisms.”181 However, feminism of all strains—and in particular legal femi-
nism—must not stray so far from its roots that purported feminists forget one of 
its core tenets, one of its most important goals:  the global liberation of women 
from any remnant of patriarchy.182 
 The U.S. has undergone a quiet but alarming backslide in women’s repro-
ductive freedoms. For example, the meticulous campaign by conservatives to 
repeal not only abortion access, but also birth control and female-specific 
healthcare, has culminated in an aggressive push to defund Planned 
Parenthood.183 This is likely due to many cultural factors—not the least of 
which is the absence of a consistent legal feminist movement, one that 
acknowledges that sex-based discrimination is the root of women’s legal disad-
vantage. 
                                                                                                             
Hungerford, Esq., to CSW Communications Procedure, Human Rights Section, UN Women 
(July 26, 2012), https://gendertrender.files.wordpress.com/2012/08/hungerford_csw_com 
munication_2012_8-28-2012.pdf [https://perma.cc/8ZY7-59LQ] [hereinafter July 26th Let-
ter]. 
176  See supra Parts I, II. 
177  Though, of course, various anatomical differences and difficulties impact women’s expe-
rience with menstruation, pregnancy, giving birth, and other female-specific abilities; but all 
women suffer under the patriarchal assumption of woman as potential mother. 
178  Kristin Kalsem & Verna L. Williams, Social Justice Feminism, 18 UCLA WOMEN’S L.J. 
131, 171 (2010). 
179  See Janus, supra note 14, at 269–70; Kalsem & Williams, supra note 188, at 171. 
180  See Mary Eaton, At the Intersection of Gender and Sexual Orientation: Toward Lesbian 
Jurisprudence, 3 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN’S STUD. 183, 184–85 (1994). 
181  See generally JENNIFER RICH, MODERN FEMINIST THEORY: AN INTRODUCTION (2d ed., rev. 
2014). 
182  See generally POLITICAL IDEOLOGIES: AN INTRODUCTION 200 (Vincent Geoghegan & 
Rick Wilford eds., Routledge 4th ed. 2014) (1984). 
183  Erin Kelly, House Sends President a Bill to Repeal Obamacare, Defund Planned 
Parenthood, USA TODAY (Jan. 6, 2016, 5:56 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/20 
16/01/06/house-sends-president-bill-repeal-obamacare-defund-planned-parenthood/7835929 
2 [https://perma.cc/2B33-56GV]. 
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 The postmodern identity movement’s reworking of sex and gender is at 
least partly to blame for this defanging of the feminist movement as a vehicle 
for women’s liberation. At its heart, postmodernism in general “represents a 
challenge to the fixity of meaning.”184 Specifically with regard to sex and gen-
der, the postmodern identity movement calls into question the ability of human 
beings to be put into sexed or gendered categories at all.185 Postmodern ideas 
have been exceedingly useful in various academic disciplines. However, the 
usefulness of such ideas in the law—made up of language as it is—has its lim-
its. 
The postmodern movement has done well to deconstruct and de-
essentialize the concept of gender186: that is, the roles that the sexes are “sup-
posed” to play, with women taking on a stereotypical feminine presentation, 
manner, and occupation, and men taking on the masculine.187 The movement 
acknowledges that gender, in this sense of roles, is obsolete.188 Indeed, even the 
United States Supreme Court supports this notion, clarifying that state agents 
must not rely upon “fixed notions concerning the roles and abilities of males 
and females.”189 The world would be well rid of the rigid gender binary, pi-
geonholing both women and men into particular presentations and occupations. 
For example, whereas women were once not welcome in the legal field at all—
considered too delicate to practice law190—the slow breakdown of gender’s ri-
gidity means that now, a woman may not be dismissed by a misogynist em-
ployer just because she does not, to his eyes, sufficiently embody or perform 
the “feminine.”191 
                                                
184  Pauline Park, GenderPAC, The Transgender Rights Movement and the Perils of a Post-
Identity Politics Paradigm, 4 GEO. J. GENDER & L. 747, 760 (2003). 
185  See id. at 761. 
186  See Eaton, supra note 190, at 185. 
187  These two concepts, however, are not monolithic. The meaning behind masculinity and 
femininity vary by culture and time. See generally GEERT HOFSTEDE, CULTURE’S 
CONSEQUENCES: COMPARING VALUES, BEHAVIORS, INSTITUTIONS, AND ORGANIZATIONS 
ACROSS NATIONS 279–341 (Jim Brace-Thompson ed., 2d ed. 2001); GEERT HOFSTEDE ET AL., 
CULTURES AND ORGANIZATIONS 135–185 (rev. 3d ed. 2010); WHEN MEN WERE MEN: 
MASCULINITY, POWER AND IDENTITY IN CLASSICAL ANTIQUITY (Lin Foxhall & John Salmon 
eds., 2013); S. Elizabeth Malloy, What Best to Protect Transsexuals from Discrimination: 
Using Current Legislation or Adopting a New Judicial Framework, 32 WOMEN’S RTS. L. 
REP. 283, 288–89 (2011). 
188  See, e.g., Archibald, supra note 66, at 8, 17–18; Jessica Knouse, Using Postmodern Fem-
inist Legal Theory to Interrupt the Reinscription of Sex Stereotypes Through the Institution 
of Marriage, 16 HASTINGS WOMEN’S L.J. 159, 160–61, 166 (2005). 
189  United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 541 (1996) (quoting Miss. Univ. for Women v. 
Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 725 (1982)). 
190  See Bradwell v. State, 83 U.S. 130, 141 (1872) (“The natural and proper timidity and del-
icacy which belongs to the female sex evidently unfits it for many of the occupations of civil 
life.”). 
191  See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 235, 242 (1989). 
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 However, the postmodern identity movement goes too far in its attempt to 
redefine the concept of sex, too, as socially constructed.192 Some postmodern 
scholars suggest, for example, a performance framework: “a doctrine determin-
ing sex based on [such factors as] whether the claimant behaved privately as a 
man or a woman . . . [and] whether the claimant held out a consistent gendered 
image to the community on a continuous basis.”193 The claim is that “[t]his doc-
trine would make sense because it would protect most third parties who came 
to rely on a person’s gendered self-presentation in everyday interaction.”194 But 
this doctrine does not “make sense” for two very significant reasons. 
First, what does it mean to “behave” as a man or a woman? What are the 
criteria? Scholars who suggest that “sexual identity . . . must be understood not 
in . . . biological terms, but according to a set of behavioral, performative 
norms that . . . create the background conditions for a person to assert, I am a 
woman.”195 The question remains: what are these behaviors? What are these 
performances? More troublingly, who gets to define these norms? Such an as-
sertion is antithetical to legal feminist thinking.196 
Second, one cannot “perform” biological sex.197 Certainly, no one should 
be fired or harassed based upon their expression or personality—which, in our 
                                                
192  Note that there are times when sex is socially assigned. Intersex individuals undoubtedly 
suffer heinous crimes in the name of medically constructed sex. See generally Georgiann 
Davis & Erin L. Murphy, Intersex Bodies as States of Exception: An Empirical Explanation 
for Unnecessary Surgical Modification, 25 FEMINIST FORMATIONS 129 (2013). Many inter-
sex individuals are violated at birth—with or without parental consent—with doctors surgi-
cally modifying their healthy genitals in order to box them into the category of “female” or 
“male.” Id. at 129–30. This issue, and the legal, medical, and ethical consequences thereof, is 
a topic too broad for this note. See, e.g., ELLEN K. FEDER, MAKING SENSE OF INTERSEX: 
CHANGING ETHICAL PERSPECTIVES IN BIOMEDICINE (2014). One future option for the U.S. 
might be to emulate the German convention, “providing a third gender option on birth certif-
icates for babies born with ambiguous genitalia.” Sneddon, supra note 17, at 1541. But with-
out that option available at present, and with our society addicted to binary concepts, when I 
discuss female reproductive issues, I include intersex women—whether or not they are capa-
ble of becoming pregnant—because of the biological roots of misogyny. 
193  Jessica A. Clarke, Adverse Possession of Identity: Radical Theory, Conventional Prac-
tice, 84 OR. L. REV. 563, 592 (2005); see also Katherine M. Franke, The Central Mistake of 
Sex Discrimination Law: The Disaggregation of Sex from Gender, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 3–4 
(1995). 
194  Clarke, supra note 203, at 592. 
195  Franke, supra note 203, at 3–4. 
196  See supra Part II.A. 
197  Many women reject the idea that womanhood is a performance, and reject typical femi-
ninity. See Elizabeth Hungerford, A Feminist Critique of “Cisgender,” LIBERATION 
COLLECTIVE (June 8, 2012), https://liberationcollective.wordpress.com/2012/06/08/a-
feminist-critique-of-cisgender [https://perma.cc/2P45-YC52]. Contrary to the supposition of 
gender-conscious scholars who assume that, in American culture, “there is little debate over 
whether to shave or wear makeup and high heels,” in fact, many feminists question—and 
have questioned for some time—such practices. Malloy, supra note 186, at 288; see LESLIE 
FEINBERG, STONE BUTCH BLUES 20–21 (1993). If postmodern “performance” were given le-
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rigid culture of the gender binary, is usually gendered. But if sex itself is lin-
guistically rendered a performance rather than a physical reality with material 
consequences, the law runs the risk of not only linguistically reducing woman-
hood to a set of performative stereotypes, but also of defanging women’s legal 
protections. For example, such thinking would put at risk those laws that pre-
serve the abortion right, laws that preserve single-sex space necessary for safe-
ty,198 education,199 and healing,200 and laws that refuse to allow employers to 
discriminate based on pregnancy.201 Such legislation might instead become 
nebulous and confused, using language the likes of which Geduldig attempted 
to force into legal precedent. 
Legally, it is necessary to discuss female-specific issues with woman-
specific language. This is because legally-sanctioned misogyny, and its role in 
the control of women, can be fought only if legal feminists are able to name the 
problem. That problem is a legal system that continues to control female repro-
duction and that refuses to deal fully with the material reality of centuries of 
misogyny that have left women at a disadvantage.202 This is the reason that, de-
spite what postmodern identity scholars claim, biology cannot be “discarded in 
favor of a more behavioral definition of both the meaning of sexual identity and 
the wrong of sex discrimination.”203 It is not women’s behavior, but society’s 
beliefs about female biology (both anatomical and neurological204) that has 
written misogyny into the law. 
                                                                                                             
gal effect, one question might be: is a woman who performs no aspect of femininity more or 
less of a woman than a male (whether or not he considers himself a woman) who does per-
form femininity? 
198  See, e.g., Katie Booth, A Look at Women-Only Transportation Around the Globe, N.Y. 
TIMES: WOMEN IN THE WORLD (Apr. 13, 2015), http://nytlive.nytimes.com/womeninthe 
world/2015/04/13/a-look-at-women-only-transportation-around-the-globe [https://perma.cc/4 
SBE-RK49]. 
199  See, for example, IRENE HARWARTH ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., WOMEN’S COLLEGES IN 
THE UNITED STATES: HISTORY, ISSUES, AND CHALLENGES viii–ix, 31, 74 (1997); Candi Bran-
cato, Women’s Colleges: Advantages of Choosing a Women’s College, INT’L STUDENT 
GUIDE TO THE U.S., http://www.internationalstudentguidetotheusa.com/articles/women_col 
leges.htm [https://perma.cc/FQF3-ZLYN] (last visited Mar. 31, 2017) for discussions about 
the advantages for women of women-only academic space. 
200  For testimonial about the importance of women-only space in the context of healing from 
sexual assault, specifically, see, for example, On Women Only Space, VANCOUVER RAPE 
RELIEF & WOMEN’S SHELTER, http://www.rapereliefshelter.bc.ca/shelter-movement/women-
only-space/women-only-space [https://perma.cc/PTP8-SMXE] (last visited Mar. 31, 2017); 
Why Women & Girls?, RAPE CRISIS ENG. & WALES, http://rapecrisis.org.uk/whywomen 
girls.php [https://perma.cc/K947-HGLP] (last visited Jan. 28, 2017). 
201  E.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (2012). 
202  This is true both in the U.S. and in most of the world. Though this Note focuses almost 
exclusively on U.S. law, the vital necessity of legal language with the capacity to address 
discrimination against women is exemplified in CEDAW, discussed infra Part IV. 
203  Franke, supra note 203, at 99. 
204  See generally supra Part II.A. 
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 In the vernacular, an adult human female is known as a woman. The post-
modern identity movement, however, has tried to shift the definition of “wom-
en” to include others who feel compelled to or who choose to adopt the label.205 
For example, the transgender movement, particularly in the U.S., has demon-
strated that regardless of anatomy, some individuals are more comfortable 
“identifying” with a group of their choosing rather than the one to which biolo-
gy has assigned them.206 However, the movement has also led to a more ex-
treme push to redefine the word woman as “anyone who identifies as a wom-
an.”207 In other words, some believe that there are no criteria for womanhood—
other than identification with the word alone. 
But a definition—especially a legal definition—should not be tautologi-
cal.208 If a woman is merely “anyone who identifies as a woman,” the term 
“woman,” and the legislation that describes and/or protects women specifically, 
is completely useless, legally and culturally. If “sex” does not exist—or at least 
if it is not to be used in the definition of “woman”—how can legal feminists 
advocate for the group that has historically been and is continuously subject to, 
at the mild end, workplace discrimination and harassment, and at the extreme, 
sexual violence and a denial of autonomous personhood? One speaker advocat-
ing for gender rights articulates this paradox without giving way to the ever-
moving target of postmodern language: “A movement that purports to include 
everyone includes no one, because it does not speak to the specificity of partic-
ular forms of oppression, which must be named in order to be addressed.”209 
And sex-based oppression—and the way it impacts women—must be named so 
that it may be addressed. 
                                                
205  See, e.g., Kaitlin Reilly, All-Female Smith College Accepts “Anyone Who Identifies as a 
Woman,” CAMBIO (May 16, 2015, 4:14 PM), http://www.cambio.com/2015/05/16/all-
female-smith-college-accepts-transgender-women [https://perma.cc/NY6T-HEUX]; Shawn 
Thomas Meerkamper, Contesting Sex Classification: The Need for Genderqueers as a Cog-
nizable Class, 12 DUKEMINIER AWARDS 1, 4 (2013) (claiming that some “may identify as a 
man one day and a woman the next”). 
206  See Levasseur, supra note 76, at 951–58. Note, however, that Levasseur’s definition of 
brain sex is unsupportable by modern science. Id. at 955. See supra Part II.A. 
207  See Reilly, supra note 204; Reaffirmation of Mission and Announcing Gender Policy, 
WELLESLEY C., http://www.wellesley.edu/news/gender-policy/communityletter [https://perm 
a.cc/3VT5-5H3Q]. But see Elizabeth Hungerford, An Open Letter to Smith College About 
Transwomen (Dec. 15, 2014), http://ehungerford.com/?p=65 [https://perma.cc/85PZ-8KDR] 
for a legal feminist response to Smith College’s policy change. “Being a woman is not a 
spiritual or metaphysical experience. It is not a feeling and it is not a performative utterance. 
Being a woman is a lived experience with material consequences. Smith’s admission policy 
must reflect some clear limitations on male gender identification, lest the social category 
‘woman’ become entirely meaningless.” Id. 
208  See, e.g., Summerlin v. Ga. Pines Cmty. Serv. Bd., 690 S.E.2d 401, 402 (Ga. 2010) (not-
ing that a tautological definition makes statutory interpretation difficult). 
209  Park, supra note 183, at 765. 
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 This line of thinking need not, and should not, legally erase transgender or 
intersex individuals. Indeed, radical feminists argue that sex-specific language 
in the law will protect intersex women and transitioned transgender women.210 
First, it will allow these populations to highlight that though they share some 
experiences with natal women, they have individual issues that themselves re-
quire linguistic specificity. Second, it will protect all human beings perceived 
by others as natal women, whom society assumes to embody the anatomy and 
the “female brain”211 that will put them at a legal disadvantage. 
C.   Modern Attempts at Claiming the Word “Woman” Versus the Legal 
Need for Linguistic Specificity 
Those writing about women’s issues should not confuse shared experience 
with identical experience. We must not cede woman-specific language needed 
for women’s protection and advancement . Postmodern scholars, especially 
those who study gender, might well view the “total elimination of ‘sex’ as a le-
gal category” as a boon.212 But legal and material reality in the United States 
does not allow for such total elimination—at least not yet. The elimination of 
sex as a category would not only destroy the language necessary to talk about 
woman-specific legal issues such as abortion, but it would also threaten the 
protections against sex discrimination that feminists have worked for so many 
decades to obtain. 
Nor should woman-specific language be abandoned out of fear of the kinds 
of threats and silencing tactics used against female defenders who dare to use 
women-specific language.213 “[T]he law has a tradition of ‘natural male domi-
nance,’” and woman-specific language is necessary to point out and decon-
struct this dominance.214 
 In advocating for the legal rights and protections of women, there is a mid-
dle ground that has yet to be reached. Everyone—female, male, transgender, 
and intersex—is entitled to equal protection under the law, and to human digni-
ty and respect. But biological differences between the sexes—and their im-
portant history and legacy of discrimination based on reproductive ability—
must not be a taboo subject, even and especially in legal discussions. American 
legal feminists and lawmakers need an accurate way to refer to historical and 
ongoing sex-based discrimination. This will allow for discussion of discrimina-
tion that only female people face, based on the capacity to become pregnant and 
                                                
210  Elizabeth Hungerford, Comment to Contact Me (April 27, 2015, 7:28 PM), 
http://ehungerford.com/?page_id=6 [https://perma.cc/3VQY-TE6L]. 
211  See generally discussion supra Part II.A. 
212  Olga Tomchin, Bodies and Bureaucracy: Legal Sex Classification and Marriage-Based 
Immigration for Trans* People, 101 CALIF. L. REV. 813, 818 (2013). 
213  See infra Part III.D. 
214  Sneddon, supra note 17, at 1537, 1545. 
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the assumed mental and personal abilities this leaves women with—or without. 
Given historical and ongoing misogyny, legal feminists must highlight the ex-
istence of women as a suspect class; we must demand linguistic precision that 
gives women a chance to acknowledge and correct ongoing discrimination. 
The United States Supreme Court once held that pregnancy discrimination 
is not sex discrimination: that is, the highest court in the land attempted to erase 
sex differences as a basis of sex discrimination.215 It is a mistake to think, given 
the climate of our time, that it might not happen again. The modern push for 
“brain sex” as the legal model is merely a return of the cyclical thinking that 
led Charlotte Gilman to reject the idea of the “female mind” as being as absurd 
as speaking of a “female liver.”216 With the danger of brain sex resurfacing as a 
legal model, those advocating for the advancement of women’s rights must take 
care.217 
If women, on the basis of our anatomy and our history of discrimination, 
are to remain even a “quasi-suspect class,”218 the language of the law must pre-
cisely describe women’s issues. If “woman” has no definition, how can animus 
(such as misogyny, the biologically-based hatred of women) be shown toward 
women? Is it merely animus toward feminine people, then? Of course, Price 
Waterhouse v. Hopkins has already shown that a woman need not be “femi-
nine” to gain sex-specific protections under Title VI.219 But this merely rein-
forces the idea that the category “women” must not become so legally broad 
that it loses all meaning.  
                                                
215  Gen. Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 136 (1976) (“[A]n exclusion of pregnancy from 
a disability-benefits plan providing general coverage is not a gender-based discrimination at 
all.” (citing Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484, 496–97 (1974))), superseded by statute, Preg-
nancy Discrimination Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-555, 92 Stat. 2076 (codified at 42 U.S.C. 
§ 2000e(k) (2012)). 
216  GILMAN, supra note 20, at 149. 
217  Though it is an extreme example, the language of postmodern gender identity has also 
been used by conservative lawmakers in Iran to legally structure gender nonconformity and 
sexual orientation as maladies that must be remedied surgically. Homosexuality is a capital 
offense; but sex change is legal. Ali Hamedani, The Gay People Pushed to Change Their 
Gender, BBC NEWS (Nov. 5, 2014), http://www.bbc.com/news/magazine-29832690 
[https://perma.cc/7RLX-5A2R]. Since “the founder of the Islamic Republic, Ayatollah 
Khomeini, issued a fatwa allowing gender reassignment surgery” in the 1980s, lesbians and 
gay men have been pressured by family, doctors, and officials alike to medically transition—
or risk death. Id. Unfortunately, this is by no means a phenomenon found only in countries 
where religious conservatism dominates the legal landscape. In the United States, young, 
gender non-conforming children are often pressured to transition by peers and even the med-
ical community. For example, one young boy—who has been exposed to the transgender 
movement but who chooses to continue identifying as a boy—has had his gender scrutinized 
and criticized by complete strangers. See Lori Duron, The New Gender Binary, HUFFINGTON 
POST (Feb. 21, 2016, 1:37 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/lori-duron/the-new-gender-
binary_b_9267482.html [https://perma.cc/JYX4-GR7Y]. 
218  Franke, supra note 203, at 6. 
219  See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 235, 258 (1989). 
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D.   Fear Tactics and Feminist Resistance 
Some third-wave feminists disagree with the idea that “woman” should 
have a definition.220 Many have campaigned with vitriol against those who 
acknowledge the sex-based discrimination of the kind discussed in this Note. 
In 2011, after their letter to the UN discussing language, sex-based dis-
crimination, and the law, Cathy Brennan and Elizabeth Hungerford were sub-
jected to an extreme harassment campaign by postmodern thinkers who object 
to a set definition of the term “woman” (or even “female”).221 And while online 
harassment of women is by no means new or rare, this campaign against Bren-
nan and Hungerford may in fact have proved these feminists’ point: postmod-
ern gender identity language obscures sex-based discrimination and makes it 
very difficult to discuss. 
A common Internet-based insult for a feminist who acknowledges the ex-
istence of biological sex is “TERF”—an acronym for “trans exclusionary (or 
exterminatory) radical feminist.”222 It is not a mere descriptor, but a silencing 
tactic, used to quiet, harass, and incite popular opinion against such women.223 
The Internet is undoubtedly a mean place, but surely one should not expect to 
see such terminology used by politicians or legal writers. 
Yet with postmodernism in the mix, expectations do not always yield re-
sults. Not only has this term become increasingly popular in mainstream online 
discourse, and even outside of the echo chamber of the Internet,224 but in aca-
demic discourse as well—including legal scholarship. For example, one book 
                                                
220  See Reilly, supra note 204. 
221  See Brennan v. Stevenson, No. JKB-15-2931, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 158848, at *2 (D. 
Md. Nov. 24, 2015); Elizabeth Hungerford, Cracks in Your Foundation: Dana Beyer, M.D. 
and Monica Roberts Support Brennan and Hungerford’s UN Letter, SEX MATTERS (Sept. 9, 
2013), http://sexnotgender.com/2013/09/09/cracks-in-your-foundation-dana-beyer-m-d-and-
monica-roberts-support-brennan-and-hungerfords-un-letter [https://perma.cc/5NPX-FJDJ]. 
222  Penny White, Why I No Longer Hate ‘TERFs’, FEMINIST CURRENT (Nov. 10, 2015), 
http://www.feministcurrent.com/2015/11/10/why-i-no-longer-hate-terfs 
[https://perma.cc/T2QW-JHYV]. 
223  See, e.g., Open Letter, We Cannot Allow Censorship and Silencing of Individuals, THE 
GUARDIAN (Feb. 14, 2015, 7:04 PM), http://www.theguardian.com/theobserver/2015/feb/14/ 
letters-censorship [https://perma.cc/4STH-HTQP]; Adam Lusher, Transgender Activists 
Target Peter Tatchell and Mary Beard After Free Speech Letter, INDEPENDENT (Feb. 16, 
2015), http://www.independent.co.uk/news/people/transgender-activists-target-peter-tatch 
ell-and-mary-beard-after-free-speech-letter-10050155.html [https://perma.cc/2VNU-YGGH] 
(detailing the ironic harassment against Tatchell after he signed the open letter criticizing the 
silencing and harassment of those who refer to sex as biological category, not identity); Vio-
lent Receipts, TUMBLR, http://violentreceipts.tumblr.com [https://perma.cc/S29Z-TBJZ] (last 
visited Mar. 31, 2017); Violent Trans Witness, TUMBLR, http://violenttransmalewit 
ness.tumblr.com [https://perma.cc/J9SC-K5SR] (last visited Mar. 31, 2017). 
224  Unsurprisingly, given this Note’s acknowledgement that biological sex has material con-
sequences, this label has been hurled at its author, both online and in at least one face-to-face 
conversation. 
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review—claiming that there are feminists who call themselves “TERFs” (a pa-
tently false statement)—states that feminists who acknowledge sex-based dis-
crimination “are actively speaking out against transgender rights.”225 This is not 
accurate. While some may in truth oppose human rights, such as the conserva-
tive politicians who believe that woman’s proper place is as a breeding and 
child-rearing machine,226 feminists who openly challenge sex-based discrimina-
tion are not speaking out against anyone’s rights; we merely draw attention to 
the age-old legal and social bias against those with female bodies—who as-
sumedly have “female brains.”227 This silencing tactic, especially when dis-
cussed with academic legitimacy, is alarming. It could easily be hijacked by the 
anti-woman rhetoric of the right wing—perhaps even codified into law. 
If “language must be led by the person with that body,”228 why are adult 
human females—women, in the vernacular—harassed and threatened by so-
called progressives for using the language that has historically protected us? 
Must women cede our protections, which are still legally necessary? Must 
women who acknowledge biological reality, and its dangers, yield the floor of 
feminism to another group merely because they find our existing platform con-
venient? 
E.    The Legal Redundancy of Sex as Identity, Rather Than Material 
Reality 
 Gender identity laws that compel employers, landlords, and business own-
ers to respect the presentation, names, and pronouns of all people—including 
intersex and transgender individuals—are immeasurably valuable.229 But these 
laws cannot replace the legal concepts of female and male.230 Instead, they 
should augment them. 
                                                
225  Asher Waite-Jones, Queer Injustice: The Criminalization of LGBT People in the United 
States by Joey L. Mogul, Andrea J. Ritchie, & Kay Whitlock, 30 BERKELEY J. GENDER L. & 
JUST. 182, 186–87 (2015). 
226  See Franke, supra note 203, at 24 (discussing Congresswoman Edith Green’s opposition 
to the inclusion of sex in the Equal Employment Opportunity Bill). 
227  See, e.g., August 1st Letter, supra note 185. See generally DWORKIN, supra note 67, and 
the works of Professor Catharine A. MacKinnon, a noted legal feminist and one of the “most 
widely-cited scholars in the English language,” for other extensive feminist discussions of 
sex-based discrimination; MacKinnon’s works are listed here: MacKinnon, Catharine A., U. 
MICH. L. SCH., https://www.law.umich.edu/FacultyBio/Pages/FacultyBio.aspx?FacID=cam 
two [https://perma.cc/SGN5-HGMF] (last visited Mar. 31, 2017). 
228  Levasseur, supra note 76, at 1002. 
229  For a Nevada-specific example, see NEV. REV. STAT. § 613.330 (2015), which makes un-
lawful “discrimination [in employment] on basis of . . . sex, sexual orientation, gender iden-
tity or expression . . .” and NEV. REV. STAT. § 118.100 (2015), which prohibits discrimina-
tion in housing on the basis of several categories including gender identity. 
230  Furthermore, despite what some proponents of the brain-sex model claim, women are put 
at risk through the passage of some gender identity laws. See, e.g., Sheila Jeffreys, Written 
Evidence Submitted to the Transgender Equality Inquiry (Aug. 20, 2015), http://data.par 
 
17 NEV. L.J. 667 ORWOLL -FINAL.DOCX 5/10/17  1:12 PM 
Summer 2017] PREGNANT PERSONS 701 
 For example, if an individual is “genderqueer” but still needs female 
healthcare,231 or if “there are trans men [female-to-male transgender individu-
als] looking to get on birth control,”232 the physical reality of sex remains; the 
language, even of the law, cannot alter it. Barring drastic surgical interven-
tion,233 femaleness—and the vulnerability to violence and legal discrimination 
it brings—is not a material reality out of which women can opt. Even if “some 
who consider themselves genderqueer may identify as a man one day and a 
woman the next,”234 society (and the law) has no access to that inner changea-
bility; and the person in question will be treated, by people and by the law, at 
least in part according to their biological sex. At any rate, the material reality of 
that person’s sex, whether the person acknowledges it or not, will inform the 
way the world interacts with them—up to and including the provision or pro-
scription of legal rights such as abortion, and access to a legal framework of 
protection against sex discrimination. Hiding that material reality behind the 
language of the postmodern identity movement is not legally helpful. 
IV.   WOMEN AS AN INTERNATIONAL SUSPECT CLASS—CONVENTION ON THE 
ELIMINATION OF ALL FORMS OF DISCRIMINATION AGAINST WOMEN 
(“CEDAW”) 
International instruments like Convention on the Elimination of all Forms 
of Discrimination Against Women (“CEDAW”) are necessary for all the class-
based reasons discussed supra.235 And it is because of CEDAW’s specificity, 
and not in spite of it as some postmodern thinkers claim, that it and conventions 
and laws like it are useful. Rightly, CEDAW does not include a broad defini-
tion of the term “woman.” Its language draws attention to the long history of 
discrimination against female-bodied people. Such specificity is necessary if 
legal scholars and lawmakers wish to remedy said discrimination.236 And in 
terms of international discourse, it is especially important to clarify the class of 
people the document intends to address, as international treaties must already 
be interpreted across different languages and through different cultural filters. 
                                                                                                             
liament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/women-and-equal 
ities-committee/transgender-equality/written/19512.html [https://perma.cc/B2ST-QTBR]. 
231  See generally Meerkamper, supra note 215, at 4. 
232  Laura Nixon, The Right to (Trans) Parent: A Reproductive Justice Approach to Repro-
ductive Rights, Fertility, and Family-Building Issues Facing Transgender People, 20 WM. & 
MARY J. OF WOMEN & L. 73, 83 (2013). 
233  Even then, genetics and years of socialization remain. 
234  Meerkamper, supra note 215, at 4. 
235  CEDAW, supra note 67. 
236  See, e.g., August 1st Letter, supra note 185. 
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A.   What Is CEDAW? 
It is not only American legal feminists who have successfully used women-
centric language to remedy legal misogyny. In the mid-twentieth century, the 
United Nations Commission on the Status of Woman initiated the idea for an 
international treaty aimed at improving the status of women worldwide.237 It 
began “to monitor the situation of women and to promote women’s rights” in 
1946.238 After more than thirty years of work and research by the Commission, 
in December 1979, the United Nations General Assembly adopted CEDAW.239 
After twenty countries (known in international law as “states”) had ratified it, 
CEDAW entered into force as an international treaty in September 1981.240 
CEDAW is the leading international convention calling for an end to legal 
and social systems holding women back from full equality and liberation.241 
CEDAW calls on its parties to eliminate not only legal, but also social, discrim-
ination.242 The substantive calls to action include eliminating all legalized dis-
crimination, temporarily adopting measures to “correct[] historical gender ine-
quality,” enacting “protective maternity legislation,” and appropriately 
addressing human sex trafficking.243 CEDAW requires its parties to submit a 
report every four years regarding the status of women in that country.244 The 
victories won by countries that have ratified CEDAW include programs aimed 
at lessening violence against women, a rise in accountability for such violence, 
public education for women, and fewer discriminatory measures being permit-
ted in the institution of marriage.245 
The vast majority of United Nations member states, and all industrialized 
democracies in the world with the exception of the United States, have ratified 
CEDAW.246 These parties have pledged to take action, and have acknowledged 
that the history of women’s oppression means that articulating international 
standards regarding women’s rights, especially in terms of reproductive rights 
and sexual violence, is necessary.247 
However, because of the ancient, insidious nature of misogyny, CEDAW is 
also “the most heavily reserved international document,” with individual states 
                                                
237  CEDAW, supra note 67. 
238  Id. 
239  Id. 
240  Id. 
241  Id. 
242  Lisa Baldez, Why Hasn’t the US Ratified the UN Women’s Rights Convention? 4 (Sept. 
1, 2011) (unpublished manuscript) http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1900 
265 [https://perma.cc/PQ4X-MNZS]. 
243  Id. 
244  Id. at 5. 
245  Id. at 18. 
246  Id. at 1. 
247  See generally CEDAW, supra note 67. 
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signatories making many substantive reservations.248 This means that these 
countries do not consider themselves bound, and other CEDAW parties do not 
hold them bound, to specific CEDAW-guaranteed rights for women.249 Many 
of these reservations are based upon individual CEDAW parties’ religious and 
cultural beliefs about the roles women should play in society.250 For example, 
the Islamic states of Bahrain, Bangladesh, and Egypt have specifically made 
reservations against Article 2,251 which “condemn[s] discrimination against 
women in all its forms.”252 The reader might imagine how much less useful 
CEDAW would be as an internationally binding document if postmodernism’s 
muddying of the term “woman” itself were used as rationale in generating yet 
more reservations.253 If the treaty protects “women,” but the class that is “wom-
en” cannot be defined (according to postmodernist thinking), then the treaty is 
useless. 
B.   CEDAW and the U.S.—A Troubled Relationship 
Although the U.S. signed CEDAW in 1980, it has not ratified it, and thus it 
is still not a party.254 The possible reasons are multifold.255 However, 
“[e]xisting research on treaty ratification provides little traction in explaining” 
the true rationale, especially considering that the U.S. has ratified other human 
rights treaties despite “institutional constraints.”256 Part of the debate over 
CEDAW’s ratification stems from the Democrat and Republican debate sur-
rounding women’s rights, not only with regard to access to abortion257 but with 
                                                
248  Nadine Gartner, Articulating Lesbian Human Rights: The Creation of a Convention on 
the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Lesbians, 14 UCLA WOMEN’S L.J. 
61, 67 (2005). 
249  Id. 
250  See Declarations, Reservations and Objections to CEDAW, UNITED NATIONS ENTITY FOR 
GENDER EQUAL. AND THE EMPOWERMENT OF WOMEN, http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/ 
cedaw/reservations-country.htm [https://perma.cc/2P4R-E3S9] (last visited Mar. 31, 2017) 
[hereinafter CEDAW Reservations]. 
251  Id. 
252  CEDAW, supra note 67, art. 2 (emphasis added). 
253  See supra Part III.C. 
254  See generally Baldez, supra note 253; Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination Against Women, UNITED NATIONS TREATY COLLECTION, https://treaties.u 
n.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=IND&mtdsg_no=IV-8&chapter=4&clang=_en [https://pe 
rma.cc/CVE9-4QN4] (last visited Mar. 31, 2017). 
255  See generally A Fact Sheet on CEDAW: Treaty for the Rights of Women, AMNESTY 
INTERNATIONAL (Aug. 25, 2005), https://www.amnestyusa.org/sites/default/files/pdfs/ced 
aw_fact_sheet.pdf [https://perma.cc/2CVB-PKKK]; Baldez, supra note 253. 
256  Baldez, supra note 253, at 2. 
257  But note that even countries where abortion is 100 percent illegal, such as Ireland, have 
ratified CEDAW—so this is a moot point. See A Fact Sheet on CEDAW, supra note 252, at 
2. 
17 NEV. L.J. 667 ORWOLL -FINAL.DOCX 5/10/17  1:12 PM 
704 NEVADA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 17:667  
regard to women’s position at large.258 Today, Republicans “remain[] stanchly 
opposed to CEDAW.”259 Another position states that “countries ratify treaties 
either because it is the morally right thing to do or because they already share 
the norms that a particular treaty promotes.”260 In that respect, perhaps the 
American refusal to become a party to CEDAW demonstrates that the U.S. 
does not, in fact, share CEDAW’s sentiments. 
Some scholars question whether these feuding politicians truly understand 
how CEDAW would operate should the U.S. ratify. In sum, the U.S. would be 
asked only to “regulate [its] own behavior in order to comply with international 
standards.”261 Since many politicians and their constituents fear the imposition 
of unpopular policy, this point is critical.262 But CEDAW “is more about pro-
cess than policy,” and could offer a step-by-step way to bring about de facto 
liberation for women.263 Whatever the reasons, the U.S. has elected not to be 
bound by international standards of women’s humanity, and has been left to its 
own devices to determine the position of women in law and society. 
C.   The Postmodernism Identity Movement’s Struggle with CEDAW 
If the linguistic obfuscation surrounding women’s issues continues—
including the postmodern debate about the very definition of the word “wom-
an”—CEDAW has little chance at ever being acknowledged in the United 
States. A human rights treaty is nothing but a collection of words—words that 
must be interpreted via their ordinary meaning, and if that is not clear, via ex-
trinsic sources like the preparatory documents of the treaty.264 But with Ameri-
can legal scholars—even legal feminists—advocating so stubbornly for a dif-
ferent interpretation of the word “woman,” how is a treaty written exclusively 
about women’s rights to be interpreted? How can the U.S. pledge, before the 
global community in which it holds such policy sway, to uphold the rights of a 
population that it cannot even define? 
  For example, one of CEDAW’s most important tenets, mentioned in Arti-
cles 11 and 12, regards eliminating pregnancy discrimination.265 Articles 12 and 
14 speak to female healthcare.266 If postmodern understandings of sex and gen-
                                                
258  Baldez, supra note 253, at 2–3, 7, 10. 
259  Id. at 19. 
260  Id. at 9. 
261  Id. at 4. 
262  Id. at 19 (describing “[r]epublican leaders [who] . . . portray the convention as represent-
ing the interests of a narrow constituency of radical feminists, who support CEDAW as a 
way to force their agenda on an unsupportive majority”). 
263  Id. at 23. 
264  Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 31, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331. 
265  CEDAW, supra note 67, art. 11–12. 
266  Id. art. 12, 14. 
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der control, would it not be an expected result for such postmodern scholars to 
oppose CEDAW given its use of woman-specific language? 
 Perhaps unsurprisingly, this is already happening. Some argue that 
CEDAW presents a problem for transgender athletes in that it “defines the term 
woman by using the word ‘sex.’”267 The complaint is that for such athletes to 
be protected under CEDAW, the Convention must “include a definition of 
‘woman’ that includes all individuals that identify as women.”268 
There are two issues with such a statement. First, CEDAW intends to fight 
discrimination against women as the term is colloquially understood—that is, 
discrimination against female people, who have historically been legally and 
socially disadvantaged due to sex-based oppression.269 To ask CEDAW to ex-
pand to include “anyone” who uses the term “woman,” no matter who they are, 
is—legally—absurd. Whom does CEDAW protect if there are no criteria for 
who a “woman” is? Second, contentions that “CEDAW is not good enough,” 
and that it should “not just [be for] those that are biologically female” (as if 
protections for biological women are “just” anything), seem to suggest that if 
CEDAW cannot protect biological females along with everyone within the 
LGBT purview, it is useless.270 Undoubtedly, lesbian, gay, bisexual, 
transgender, intersex, asexual, and other sexual minorities deserve legal protec-
tions. But, as their issues are not (always271) the same as women’s struggles un-
der international law with its history of patriarchy, CEDAW is not the most ap-
propriate instrument through which sexual minorities may vindicate their 
rights. Indeed, this postmodern request for linguistic expansion within a docu-
ment intended to protect a very specific class of people perfectly crystalizes the 
argument that just as women must have access to legal language that specifies 
and addresses our issues, so must all other marginalized populations. 
 Others argue outright that CEDAW is dangerous because it does not in-
clude men or “other” sexes, that it “must . . . be ‘unsexed’ to realize its poten-
cy.”272 But this is counter to the treaty’s purpose—and to the purposes of femi-
nism. Women’s rights must remain a focus for legal feminists striving to undo 
                                                
267  Emily J. Cooper, Gender Testing in Athletic Competitions—Human Rights Violations: 
Why Michael Phelps is Praised and Caster Semenya is Chastised, 14 J. GENDER, RACE & 
JUST. 233, 257 (2010). 
268  Id. 
269  See supra Parts I, II, III. 
270  “Lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender.” Cooper, supra note 277, at 257, 262. 
271  For a discussion of the need for separate instruments for the lesbian population within the 
umbrella acronym, see generally Gartner, supra note 258. For agreement that an LGBT-
specific instrument would be most helpful, see Rebecca Lee, Forced Sterilization and Man-
datory Divorce: How a Majority of Council of Europe Member States’ Laws Regarding 
Gender Identity Violate the Internationally and Regionally Established Human Rights of 
Trans* People, 33 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 114, 149 (2015). 
272  Darren Rosenblum, Unsex CEDAW, or What’s Wrong with Women’s Rights, 20 COLUM. 
J. GENDER & L. 98, 100 (2011). 
17 NEV. L.J. 667 ORWOLL -FINAL.DOCX 5/10/17  1:12 PM 
706 NEVADA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 17:667  
centuries of legal inequities suffered by women. One author claims that while 
“[w]omen face subjugation by the power relationship that establishes men as 
superior,” the more significant problem arises “from the division of humanity 
into two groups, one of which necessarily sits on top.”273 It is this variety of bi-
narism against which legal feminism fights. Feminists believe that there need 
not be a hierarchal system within categories of sex and gender.274 Feminists re-
ject the notion that categories must lead to hierarchy.275 In particular, feminists 
reject the notion that fighting for women’s rights inherently subjects men to “to 
the Despotism of the Peticoat [sic].”276 
Because everyone suffers from rigidly enforced gender roles and norms, a 
document that tried to “eliminat[e] . . . categories themselves” would not solve 
the problem.277 The categories already exist in the eyes of society and the law. 
Humans “are incorrigible categorizers,” and there is no evidence to suggest that 
humanity’s fascination with putting things in categories will ever end.278 In 
fact, postmodernism’s obsession with expanding categories simply goes to 
show that terms intending to indicate categories, terms like “woman,” will al-
ways be around. Further, and more importantly, the category of sex has conse-
quences in material reality: for example, rape, forced pregnancy, and discrimi-
nation based on female anatomy and on stereotype.279 These are not phenomena 
that can be “eliminated” by postmodern attempts to expand or undo categoriza-
tion itself. Indeed, it is these material consequences that CEDAW fights 
against. 
CEDAW did not create the sex binary or neglect women and girls in the 
American Declaration of Independence, the Constitution, state legislation, and 
Supreme Court precedent. The argument that there’s something “wrong with 
women’s rights”280 because certain legal documents specify women—a group 
that, with international consensus, has suffered and still suffers discrimina-
tion—is ahistorical, and deeply disrespectful to women’s rights’ defenders who 
                                                
273  Id. at 104. 
274  See, e.g., Ruth Groenhout, The Virtue of Care: Aristotelian Ethics and Contemporary 
Ethics of Care, in FEMINIST INTERPRETATIONS OF ARISTOTLE 171, 177 (Cynthia A. Freeland, 
ed., 1998) (naming “a rejection of hierarchies” as a “central feature of feminist thought”); 
Knouse, supra note 198, at 166 (highlighting that “[t]he postmodern feminist goal is not 
simply to equalize power between the sexes or to redefine the existing sex roles. Rather, the 
goal is to destabilize the sex hierarchy . . . .”). 
275  Knouse, supra note 198, at 166. 
276  Letter from John Adams to Abigail Adams, supra note 33. 
277  Rosenblum, supra note 282, at 101. 
278  NATALIE ANGIER, WOMAN: AN INTIMATE GEOGRAPHY 195 (First Anchor Books ed. 
2000). 
279  See supra Part III.A. 
280  Especially when said “wrongness” is claimed by a man. The power of the title “What’s 
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supra note 282. 
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acknowledge that the world still has a long way to go in terms of rectifying mi-
sogyny. Until that historical discrimination is fully undermined, it is difficult 
even to dream of a world where the category of “woman” does not matter—or 
should not, legally, matter.281 Legal feminists who focus on this population are 
not only not in the wrong, but are in fact doing the work of justice, given the 
historical and contemporary reasons discussed throughout this Note. 
V.   CONCLUSIONS AND SUGGESTIONS FOR MARCHING FORWARD 
 As stated in the Introduction, full and equal dignity of every human being 
is self-evident. Unfortunately, the current social and legal system does not af-
ford equal dignity to all. With that in mind, each culturally and legally disad-
vantaged group must be able to address its disadvantages with linguistic speci-
ficity. To that end, women need woman-specific language, especially in an area 
of such linguistic precision as the law. Without it, we could well face another 
Geduldig. 
I believe it is possible to respect the legal rights both of women—who have 
been subjected to all of the historical, legalized misogyny discussed above—
and of those who are most comfortable conceiving of reality through the new 
wave of postmodern politics, with its shifting identities and questioning of bi-
naries. Sometimes these rights overlap, for example in the person of one born 
female (who may still need access to services such as female healthcare and 
who are thus directly impacted by, for example, anti-choice legislation) but 
who has chosen to pursue another gendered label. But for such individuals, 
both of those realities—biological sex and postmodern conception of gender—
will be sources of discrimination. It is vital, then, that the law not kowtow to 
postmodern scholars who insist that biological sex is obsolete. The law must be 
able to identify and protect such an individual on the basis of both realities: 
“gender identity,” and biological sex. 
To do so, the language of the American legal system should continue to list 
“sex” and “gender identity” as separate concepts, for example in civil rights 
statutes such as the anti-discrimination statutes discussed above. The law 
should absolutely not replace the concept of “sex,” protected by these and other 
civil rights statutes such as Title VII, with “brain sex.”  
In addition, the U.S. might choose to become more heavily involved in the 
international discussions of the legal rights of marginalized people. The U.S. 
might ratify CEDAW, and thus create more space in the language of the law to 
speak of issues that impact women and only women. It might also help promul-
gate an international LGBT convention that offers linguistic specificity in the 
discussion of gender transition (among other discussions that such a convention 
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would help promote, including the rights of lesbians, gay men, and bisexuals to 
love and marry whom they choose, free from persecution). 
The key to preserving and expanding the legal rights of all marginalized 
groups will be linguistic. This is a fight—as every legal fight is—about lan-
guage. Legal feminists should not surrender the battle against the idea that, le-
gally, the word “woman” means “anyone who identifies as a woman.” Those 
who recognize the history of legalized sex-based discrimination are all too 
aware of what happens when the realities of sex are obfuscated by language. 
The warning of Geduldig still hangs over us all. But the legal community can 
and should acknowledge the distinct existence of both sex, as a biological reali-
ty, and “gender,” as a cultural phenomenon that both oppresses and liberates. 
Once we do, we will have won half the war. 
This will require compromise on all sides of this debate. Those who pursue 
names and gendered identities different from those they started life with suffer 
discrimination in every facet of life. But those who adhere to postmodern iden-
tity politics must also be willing to concede that women suffer along a differ-
ent—sometimes intersecting—axis: that of sex-based discrimination. Both of 
these realities are valid and deserve dedicated, linguistically precise legal dis-
cussion. 
History—and the current, softened trajectory of feminism—each reveal 
that Western culture still needs woman-specific language to fight the remnants 
of legalized misogyny and neurosexism. Legal feminists, and all who advocate 
for the equal rights of all groups, should worry about the consequences of legal-
ly defining sex through anything other than biology, including through the 
brain. We should also take heed of the vitriol with which this change in defini-
tion is currently being championed. But none should be silenced by it. 
